

AD-A118 149

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

F/G 9/5

THE EVOLUTION OF ARMED FORCES ENLISTED PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT POL--ETC(U)

JUL 82 J M HAYES

F49620-82-C-0018


UNCLASSIFIED

RAND/N-1893-AF

NL

1 OF 2

AD A
118 149



12

AD A118149

A RAND NOTE

**THE EVOLUTION OF ARMED FORCES
ENLISTED PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT POLICIES:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

James H. Hayes

July 1982


N-1893-AF

Prepared for

The United States Air Force

DTIC
E
AUG 13 1982
H

DTIC FILE COPY



DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

82 08 13 009

The research reported here was sponsored by the Directorate of Operational Requirements, Deputy Chief of Staff/Research, Development, and Acquisition, HQ USAF, under Contract F49620-82-C-0018. The United States Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation hereon.

The Rand Publications Series: The Report is the principal publication documenting and transmitting Rand's major research findings and final research results. The Rand Note reports other outputs of sponsored research for general distribution. Publications of The Rand Corporation do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the sponsors of Rand research.

Published by The Rand Corporation

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER N-1893-AF	2. JOINT ACCESSION NO. AD A118149	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) The Evolution of Armed Forces Enlisted Personnel Management Policies--Executive Summary		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Interim
7. AUTHOR(s) J. H. Hayes		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS The Rand Corporation 1700 Main Street Santa Monica, California 90406		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) F49620-82-C-0018
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Requirements, Programs and Studies Group (AF/RDQM) Ofc, DCS/R&D and Acquisition Hq USAF, Washington, D.C. 20330		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		12. REPORT DATE July 1982
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 114
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report) no restrictions		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Armed Forces (United States) Enlisted Personnel Personnel Management		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Executive summary which describes the evolution of principles and procedures that guide the various branches of the armed services in managing their enlisted forces. The principles and procedures are the result of public pressures and struggles among the Congress, the Executive, and the services. The struggles are traced from the creation of the Continental Army in 1776 through the next 200 years. Particular attention is paid to recruitment, retention, compensation, desertion, punishment, drinking, and race.		

A RAND NOTE

THE EVOLUTION OF ARMED FORCES
ENLISTED PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT POLICIES:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

James H. Hayes

July 1982

N-1893-AF

Prepared for

The United States Air Force

AUG 13 1982

H

Rand
SANTA MONICA, CA. 90406

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

PREFACE

This Note summarizes a study of military enlisted personnel management policies, which was undertaken by Rand at the request of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff/Personnel, United States Air Force. It is a companion piece to an earlier report by the same author on the historic development of military officer personnel management policies.[1] The work was carried out under the Project AIR FORCE study effort "Enlisted Force Management," as part of Rand's Resource Management Program.

The purpose of the study is twofold. First, it complements and rounds out the work done on the historical development of officer personnel management policies. Second, it serves as a source for others who may be doing work on enlisted personnel policies and who may wonder why certain policies have evolved into their present form. By providing this historical background, the Note illuminates the battles waged over the past two hundred years between those who advocated a certain policy and those who opposed it. The resultant compromises are the policies that exist today. Efforts to make changes in those policies may, as a consequence of certain constant desires on the part of most military personnel, merely result in a repetition of battles already waged during the history of the armed forces.

This study should be useful to Air Force and Department of Defense staff personnel with personnel-related responsibilities.

[1] J. H. Hayes, The Evolution of Military Officer Personnel Management Policies: A Preliminary Study with Parallels from Industry--Executive Summary, The Rand Corporation, R-2276/1-AF, August 1978.


SUMMARY

Many of the problems in managing the enlisted personnel of the armed forces are not new. They have been present since the inception of our forces in Colonial times. Many of these problems were solved as the services perceived that change was necessary; others were solved only because the nation recognized a need for reform.

The first problem that society attacked was discipline. The services, left to their own devices, would not have changed quickly, and disciplinary methods would have remained cruel and, in some instances, inhumane. Commanders had life-and-death powers over their men, almost in the literal sense. Sailors were particularly susceptible to the whims of commanders, whose usual means of securing discipline was flogging. A sailor could be given his "dozen" for the slightest offense (e.g., spitting on the deck), and he could be killed by "flogging him around the fleet" for more serious offenses (e.g., striking an officer).

Flogging was also used by the Army. However, by the time of the War of 1812 the practice had been abolished because of pressure from society. Citizens, who may have been indifferent to the plight of the regular soldier, suddenly found that their sons and husbands who had been drafted in large numbers in the militia were subject to the same discipline as the regulars. Congress no doubt heard many complaints and, reacting to the common desire, outlawed flogging in the Army.

No such luck befell the sailor. He was at sea for long periods of time--sometimes three to four years. Moreover, because he was out of sight and out of mind his plight received little attention from the



public, primarily because no large numbers of this sector were in the Navy and the ordinary sailor was generally considered to be little more than a wharf-rat. There was, of course, a growing awareness of the treatment of sailors over the years, popularized in part by such books as Two Years before the Mast. Once again, social pressures began to build against two facets of the sailor's life: flogging and what many thought was the reason why it had to be used so often--grog.

Although grog was abolished as a component of the ration by the appropriation bill of 28 September 1850, the fight against flogging in the Navy was longer and harder. Flogging was even related to slavery, with the opponents of flogging alleging that the sailor was worse off than the slave. The issues were emotional ones, no doubt, and were long fought in Congress. Finally, legislation of 1 September 1862 guaranteed that a sailor could no longer be flogged. Thus, it was the force of social and citizen pressures that caused the changes in the discipline of enlisted men.

A second major problem that plagued early attempts to develop an efficient armed force was desertion. There were many contributing factors, and the services struggled with these over the first two hundred years without really finding a solution. They did learn that no one cause of desertion was predominant. Some men deserted because they had made a wrong decision in the choice of careers, and desertion was for them the easiest solution. Pay was a reason for some--they could make more in a week or two in the civil economy than they could make in a month in the service and, as important, they escaped the harsh discipline of military life. Food was the cause of desertion for at least one man. Others simply could not abide the officers who were

placed over them. Finally, there was a medley of minor reasons ranging from cherchez la femme to the excitement of going to find gold in a new El Dorado.

Other data indicate that desertion rates seemed to follow unemployment rates, the weather, and the quality of personnel. When the economy was good, desertion rates were higher than when the economy was bad. When the weather was favorable, as in the summer, the rates were higher than when the weather was unfavorable, as in the winter. The "come in out of the cold" notion seemed to have some effect. Whatever the influence of such factors, commanders seemed to agree, however, that lower desertion rates were found among those men whom they considered to be "higher" quality personnel.

It was not until the mid-1950s that the basic solution for large-scale desertions seemed to be found. By passing regulations that made it easier for the services to rid themselves of men who began by being troublemakers in a small way and then worked up to larger disciplinary problems, the services did away with a group that seemed to be predisposed to desert. Regulations were issued making it easier to dispense with personnel having these and other undesirable traits. Other screening devices such as mental and aptitude tests undoubtedly resulted in the enlistment of a higher quality personnel. We find, therefore, that whereas annual desertions took as high as 14 to 15 percent of the force in the 19th century, in the last half of the 20th century the rates were often less than one percent.

Desertion was one facet of requirements determination. The methods by which requirements for ground force personnel have been computed are rather obscure over the course of our history. Colonial period

requirements seemed to be based on a desire to outnumber the enemy by a factor of two to one. The Mexican War requirements seemed to have no rational basis. Civil War requirements seemed to have grown like topsy, while the Spanish-American War requirements were apparently founded on nothing more substantial than an effort to accommodate all those who wished to participate in an extremely popular war.

The first rational attempt to come to grips with Army requirements was made in World War I when General Pershing was sent to France in advance of the troops he was to command. There, in consultation with French and British planners and based on the military situation as it existed at the time (after the French mutiny arising out of the Nivelle offensive and the Somme offensives, which left the British depleted and exhausted), General Pershing recommended a 20-division force. Although the force recommendation changed throughout the course of the war, the first force structure had the merit of being based upon factors derived by our allies and, while not ensuring victory for them, had nevertheless preserved them from defeat. This pragmatic consideration led in turn to the "division slice" and the "wing slice" used in World War II.

Navy requirements during the same period were also based upon the pragmatic consideration of the numbers of capital ships in the fleet of probable enemies. Congress could and did demur on this issue and on the ratio of support ships needed. Nevertheless, once the number of ships was decided, the number of men to man them could be computed in a theoretically straightforward fashion. In practice, issues of budgets, disagreements over ship manning levels, and the size and composition of support forces made final resolution of requirements more difficult. The theory, however, was somewhat more tractable than for the ground forces.

Similarly, Air Force requirements could be reduced to requirements for aircraft. In practice, major arguments and disagreements could and still do rage about aircraft types and quantities and manning requirements for support personnel (mechanics, communicators, engineers, and the like).

The quality of the enlisted corps was early recognized as requiring a group of permanent enlisted men. By the middle of the 19th century, both the Army and the Navy tried to establish a corps of apprentices composed of individuals who would be taken into the services at an early age. Thereafter, they would be educated, trained in their professional duties, and would ultimately form the backbone of the noncommissioned officer corps. Moreover, because they had literally grown up in the service, such men would become careerists with an ultimate gain in overall efficiency. Finally, the long-term costs would be less because there would be more stability and hence less cost associated with recruitment and training. Unfortunately, the apprentice concept never did achieve the success hoped for it and was abandoned.

The quality problem was solved in part when the nation resorted to a national draft. This meant that a cross section of the nation would serve--a somewhat more equitable distribution of manpower skills than the more random "volunteer" selection process. In addition, the huge citizen armies of World Wars I and II led to improved training and classification procedures that did much to distribute quality personnel, even though there was, and probably always will be, a shortage of such personnel.

In some ways, service practices were auguries of future social developments. Retired pay was a serviceman's benefit long before retirement plans became a fringe benefit in civilian life. Similarly, government insurance policies, assistance to dependents, and medical care for dependents were long familiar to the military man, whereas his civilian counterpart did not receive most of these benefits until well into the 20th century.

Conversely, once industrial practices and fringe benefits came to parallel those in the service, men began to leave the service for industry. Thus, we see airplane mechanics being wooed during the early days of the then new airline industry; electronic technicians being wooed by aerospace; and other scarce skills being sought by large industries. In reaction, the services sought and obtained special pay programs from Congress as incentives to keep men on active duty. The final step was to make military pay reasonably comparable to civilian pay, which, of course, started the argument that is debated even today over the definition of and the value of comparability.

In still another important respect, the services were ahead of society. In 1948 an executive order by President Truman set in force the racial integration of the services. This order put an end to two hundred years of mismanagement of about 10 percent of military manpower.

The reasons for the mismanagement of black manpower are complex but in the final analysis reflected the society as a whole because segregation, until recently, was an essential element of American life. This is not a total answer, however, because the blacks served in all of our wars (except the Mexican War) in large numbers and until the Civil War served on a nonsegregated basis.

Part of the answer lies in the perception of the black in stereotypes: He seems to have been considered as best suited to serve as a cook or a mess boy during the Colonial period, even though so unlikely a source as a Hessian diarist noted the presence of large numbers of blacks in the infantry of the Revolutionary Army. Part of the answer lies in the black population's difficulty in obtaining an education. Large numbers of blacks ended up in the World War drafts in classification categories IV and V because that index was a measure of trainability, and the less education a man had the more likely he was to score in the IV or V category. Part of the answer lies in fear--the fear, particularly in the South during the early days of the nation, that to place arms in the hands of a black was to invite violence or revolution even though history shows that the black's reaction was quite the reverse. The black wanted to prove his loyalty and to be accepted into the mainstream of American society. In fact, the answer is a combination of all of the above; because of pragmatic considerations, all-black units were deemed too time-consuming to train. Yet with the social revolution of the 20th century, the black has been able to take his place in integrated units and has proved in Korea and Vietnam that he is equal in fighting skills.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author is grateful to Colonel Alan L. Gropman and Dr. Michael D. Mihalka for valuable suggestions that have materially improved the quality of this Note.

CONTENTS

PREFACE	iii
SUMMARY	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	xiii
TABLES	xvii

Section

I. INTRODUCTION	1
Background	1
Framework for Discussion	2
II. THE QUALITY OF LIFE	3
III. PAY	16
IV. REQUIREMENTS	31
V. DESERTION	45
VI. RECRUITMENT AND QUALITY OF PERSONNEL	61
VII. THE USE OF BLACK MANPOWER	88
BIBLIOGRAPHY	107

TABLES

1.	Dates of Initiation of Military Pay and Other Incentive Programs	21
2.	Army and Navy Desertion Rates, 1867-1895	46
3.	Desertions of Navy Enlisted Men, 1870-1893	49
4.	Army Desertions by Month, 1905-1907	51
5.	Army Desertion Rates versus National Unemployment Rates, 1900-1917	53
6.	Navy Desertions by Rating	55
7.	Army and Navy Desertion Rates, 1900-1917	57
8.	Enlisted Grade Structure, 1954	83
9.	Civilian Skills versus Air Force Requirements	85

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT FILMED

I. INTRODUCTION

For it's Tommy this, an'
Tommy that, an' "Chuck him
out, the brute!"
But it's "Saviour of 'is
country," when the guns
begin to shoot.

"Tommy," Kipling

BACKGROUND

The pay of military personnel and personnel support functions are a significant and highly visible portion of defense expenditures. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Executive, Congress, and the nation are and will be concerned that personnel management policies are directed to ensuring that personnel are managed in the most efficient manner possible.

The personnel management policies now in effect for enlisted men are the normal outgrowth of our military history. They represent the struggle among Congress, the Executive, and the armed forces over a period of two hundred years. At various times, two of the three antagonists have formed coalitions against the third, and at other times all three have been the object of concerted efforts by civilian groups to make changes deemed in the nation's best interests because of changing moral and ethical values. This struggle and all of its hidden implications are now buried in the masses of regulations, laws, executive orders, and customs of the services that comprise today's

enlisted personnel management policies. The purpose of this Note is to elaborate and reveal the essential elements of this struggle.

FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSION

The history of enlisted personnel management can be divided into four roughly defined periods. The first began with the formation of the armed forces during the Revolutionary War, lasting until the first third of the 19th century. The second started immediately thereafter and lasted until the Civil War. The third began with the Civil War and spanned the Spanish-American War. The final period covers from that war to the present.

During these four periods, there were severe problems that received varying degrees of emphasis, depending on historical and social factors peculiar to the decade or to the century. The evolution of management policies revolved around these problem areas: recruitment, retention, requirements, desertion, pay, quality of life (including punishment), and the proper use of black personnel. Rather than an historical treatment, we chose to discuss each problem area separately.

A note on terminology is in order: An enlisted person is anyone who is not an officer or a warrant officer.

II. THE QUALITY OF LIFE

No man will be a sailor who has the contrivance to get himself in jail, for being in a ship is being in a jail, with the chance of being drowned. . . . A man in jail has more room, better food, and commonly better company.

Samuel Johnson to James Boswell,
16 March 1759

In Colonial America, early efforts to improve the quality of life for the enlisted man were ostensibly directed toward correcting forms of punishment, excessive use of liquor, inadequacy of barracks and sanitation facilities, poor quality of food, abominable hospital and medical care, and an appalling insensitivity toward the families of servicemen. But such efforts to improve morale were almost, but fortunately not entirely, ineffective during that time.

When George Washington assumed command of the Army near Boston on 3 July 1775, its organization was in shambles. None of the men were enlisted beyond the end of 1775, and the desertion and discharge rates of the others were high. Company and regimental organizational practices were hopelessly nonstandard, and there was no overall larger organizational structure into which smaller units could be incorporated. Massachusetts had 59 men to a company with 10 or 11 companies per regiment, New Hampshire and Rhode Island had 590 men in a regiment, and Connecticut had 1000 men. Discipline was lacking, sanitation was

nonexistent, and the men lived in everything from a tent to a turf hut to a shelter made of brush to simply the clothes they had on their backs. The first step, therefore, was to create order by establishing and enforcing a state of discipline.

Efforts to impose discipline exacted a price. Punishments had to be administered and rigorously enforced. Sadly, most of those punishments were almost barbaric in nature. Executions were common, flogging was routine, and more serious punishments were unthinkable by today's standards. Nevertheless, they were sanctioned by the first articles of war that were passed by Congress on 20 September 1776 when it resolved "that from and after the publication of the following articles, in the respective armies of the United States, the rules and articles by which the said armies have heretofore been governed shall be, and they are hereby repealed."

The new articles contained no graduated scale of punishments as do today's articles. Instead, flogging was a common punishment, and more serious punishments such as spread-eagle on a cannon wheel, bucking and gagging, and riding a wooden horse often led to physical harm to the victim. The favorite punishment was 39 lashes with the cat. This number was considered to be morally acceptable because of the biblical passage that reads "five times received I forty stripes save one." On the other hand, the articles generously prescribed that "no person shall be sentenced to suffer death, except in cases expressly mentioned in the foregoing articles: nor shall more than 100 lashes be inflicted on any offender." The truth was, of course, that a hundred lashes if applied vigorously almost invariably resulted in death either from the lashes themselves or complications therefrom.

Punishments in the Navy were equally severe with such added cruelties as keel-hauling, by which a man was dragged from one side of the ship to the other under the keel. Death was often the result. The cat was also used to flog a man around the fleet with all hands on each ship observing the punishment pour encourager les autres. This punishment almost always ended in death.

Some relief from these harsh measures began to appear just before the War of 1812 when the Army outlawed flogging. Why the Army did so is obscure, but one may surmise that while it was easy for the civilian population to ignore the plight of the regular soldier and sailor during peacetime, during the war the militia system resulted in large numbers of citizens being called to the colors. Thus, people who might have condoned punishments applied to the regulars now saw the same punishments inflicted on their family members. Thus, just before the War of 1812, when large numbers of militia from prominent families in Washington were called to service, the hue and cry must have been immediate.

The sailor, however, was less fortunate. He was frequently on cruises that lasted three to four years. He was out of sight and he had no champion. In addition, because most sailors were recruited or impressed from the questionable environment of the waterfront, he was considered subhuman.

These differences made the fight to outlaw flogging in the Navy more difficult. There was an outpouring of emotional rhetoric about customs, slavery, and manly punishment that had little to do with the degrading and brutal nature of the punishment itself and the psychological effects it had on the victim.

Agitation against flogging in the Navy started in Congress in 1820 and grew thereafter at a steady pace. There was little evidence that the anti-flogging forces were making headway in their fight until 26 September 1831 when the Secretary of the Navy issued a circular that stated in part that "till Congress deem it proper to alter the existing laws concerning punishment in the Navy, and whenever those laws allow a discretion in the choice of punishments, the first resort, in the case of offenses by seamen, is recommended to be always had to badges of disgrace rather than to the humiliating practice of whipping."

To be sure, failure to define "badges of disgrace" created problems for ship commanders. Naval special orders show that one ship's captain was brought before a court-martial because he punished a young seaman by tying the boy to a gun, "his trousers lowered, and a small quantity of tar (described by some witnesses as the size of a dollar and by others as the size of a man's head) applied with oakum to his backside along with a half-dozen parrot feathers." The captain was found guilty, but the President decreased the sentence because he interpreted the action as within the spirit of the regulations prescribing badges of disgrace rather than flogging.

On the other hand, there were those stern souls who insisted that the sailor, himself, wished to preserve this "manly" form of punishment. One Commodore told a tale in which

an old seaman was brought to the gangway . . . for some offense he had committed: when the Captain said to him, "You are only an old woman unworthy of being punished as a man." And he ordered the boatswain's mate to dress him in tarpauling to represent a woman. The old man protested that he was a man, and was ready to receive the punishment of a man. "Give me," said he, "my dozen, or as many lashes as you think

proper, but I will not submit to being disgraced. I'll jump overboard rather than submit to it." The dressing was completed. The man went forward, and immediately threw himself under the bows of the ship . . . he sank to rise no more.

Regardless of arguments pro and con, by the beginning of 1850 the opposition to flogging had become so intense that the Secretary of the Navy sent a letter to the leading officers of the Navy to determine their views on the subject. As might be expected, the Navy, almost to a man, was against the abolition of flogging. Some sailors even "petitioned Congress to leave them this manly form of punishment."

Finally, the issue of slavery was introduced. In trying to point out how well slaves were being treated, proponents of slavery only succeeded in exposing the poor lot of the sailor. One senator in a burst of inexact, pompous, and politically expedient oratory noted:

These men are our brethren; they are not the descendants of the curly-headed African, on whose behalf it is so unpopular and offensive to speak a word of sympathy. No, sir; these are the fair-haired rose-cheeked sons of New England and the West, who are subjected to degradation and cruelty, compared with which the servitude of the South is freedom, and the Algerine cruelty is Christian kindness.

Another senator cited the case of the training ship Pennsylvania:

As a receiving ship it was tied up at a wharf, yet during 1846 floggings were administered to 55 men, or a little better than one a week. The following year the same ship reported 152 floggings or three a week. Flogging had so improved the discipline of the men that during 1848 it was resorted to in 239 cases! It was easy to see how effective this sort of discipline had been.

In the end, reason triumphed, and a rider on the appropriations bill of 28 September 1850 outlawed flogging in the Navy. The politics

of the issue were such that the Northern senators supported the bill and the Southern senators did not. Politics aside, the senseless flogging that had plagued the Navy and its men for a half-century came to an end.

Many citizens as well as some naval officers saw a connection between flogging and alcohol. The issuance of rum had long been a custom in the British Navy, and the American Navy, in modeling itself after the British, carried over the tradition of distributing grog daily. Liquor in the Navy was sanctioned legally by Congress in "An Act to provide a naval armament," approved 27 March 1794, which established a part of the sailor's ration to be "one half-pint of distilled spirits per day, or, in lieu thereof, one quart of beer per day, to each ration."

The quantity of spirits authorized by the act was not excessive enough to produce drunkenness, although prolonged exposure to, and the use of, the ration no doubt produced a taste for more. Consequently, to satisfy their craving, sailors often indulged in subterfuge. This led officers to an unremitting watch of sailors in port and to a battle of wits between the officers and men--the one trying to prevent the smuggling of liquor, the other trying to outwit him.

Overindulgence in alcohol seems to have been a national vice but received little attention until sometime after the War of 1812 when there was an increase in national evangelical movements. By 1828 the temperance movement had reached such proportions that "The Sailor's Magazine" declared that it could no longer ignore the cause. By 1829 the magazine was in a position to make a positive suggestion for decreasing the dependence of the sailor on alcohol by giving him an alternative--price out the grog ration and let the sailor draw money

instead of grog. On 25 February 1829, in response to a resolution of Congress, the Secretary of the Navy asked three prominent surgeons whether the spirit ration was "necessary or expedient" for midshipmen. The Secretary also wanted to know the effect of spirits on the health and morals of the midshipmen as well as on "the discipline and character of the Navy."

Despite the finding about 20 years earlier by a Secretary of the Navy that "the sailors are by law allowed Spirit, but being persuaded that Whiskey is a more wholesome drink as well as a much more economical one, I am anxious to introduce the use of it into our Navy generally," the three surgeons found that spirits were injurious to the health and morals of seamen.

The ensuing debate was characteristic. It wallowed in the treacherous waters between the Charybdis of illogic and the Scylla of no facts. The chairman of the House Naval Committee thought "it was inexpedient to make our sailors 'cold water drinkers' . . . it would reduce their efficiency and impair their courage, generosity, and bravery . . . if some practical scheme could be devised, he would support it." The chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs "felt that liquor served some useful purpose and ought not to be interdicted . . . a law would cause discontent . . . furthermore, he was opposed to 'sudden and violent innovations.'" A counterproposal suggested that a similar inquiry should be made into the expediency of providing some means of discontinuing the use of fermented liquors among members of Congress. This representative "for his part, was determined to ascertain whether his colleagues were as willing to curtail their own allowance of intoxicants as they were to limit that of others."

In the end, a resolution was passed to allow payment of money in lieu of the grog ration. However, the resolution was not made legal until 29 August 1842. The act stated:

no commissioned officer or mid-shipman, or any person under twenty-one years of age, shall be allowed to draw the spirit part of the daily ration; (a) and all other persons shall be permitted to relinquish that part of their ration, under such restrictions as the President of the United States may authorize; and to every person who, by this section, is prohibited from drawing, or who may relinquish the spirit part of his ration, there shall be paid, in lieu thereof, the value of the same in money, according to the prices which are or may be established for the same.

Over the next 15 years, the temperance movement continued to gain strength. Those arguing against grog contended that it was injurious to the health of the men, that its prohibition would save space aboard ships, that it was a fire hazard because spirits were combustible, that it degraded men, that it was illogical to pass laws punishing drunkenness in the civil population and yet permit grog on board ship, that it led to the enlistment of poorer quality personnel, and that it perpetuated flogging. All of these arguments were no doubt true to a greater or lesser extent although they were spurred by emotionalism and moral fervor. Some temperance reformers advocated programs that were coercive, endangering individual liberties. Fortunately, wisdom prevailed.

Despite the preoccupation of the nation with the Civil War, the issue of grog or no grog in the Navy continued to receive attention. The new Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, "tackled the problems of naval administration with great energy and soon transformed the Navy Department into a highly efficient organization." In addition, his

Assistant Secretary, Gustavus Vasa Fox, who had been an officer in the Navy for 18 years before resigning in 1856, was well acquainted with the problems of drinking and was also a close friend of a member of the Senate Naval Committee. This confluence of friendship, interest, and experience resulted in an amendment to the appropriation bill to end the spirit ration after 1 September 1862. This bill, despite violent debate, was adopted and became law on 14 July 1862, and grog was eliminated from the ration.

Food was and still is a major consideration in the quality of life of the enlisted man. In our earliest history, food was monotonously plain and not nutritious. It was well known that men on ships suffered more than their normal share of digestive ailments. The soldier's life was similarly affected by the lack of qualified cooks--each man was required to take turns at cooking.

The monotony of the diet can be inferred from the naval ration prescribed in 1794 and that remained virtually unchanged for almost a hundred years. Indeed, the major change up to the Civil War was the elimination of spirits as noted earlier. The ration was described as follows:

Sunday, one pound of bread, one pound and a half of beef, and half a pint of rice: Monday, one pound of bread, one pound of pork, half a pint of peas or beans, and four ounces of cheese: Tuesday, one pound of bread, one pound and a half of beef, and one pound of potatoes or turnips, and pudding: Wednesday, one pound of bread, two ounces of butter, or, in lieu thereof, six ounces of molasses, four ounces of cheese, and half a pint of rice: Thursday, one pound of bread, one pound of pork, and half a pint of peas or beans: Friday, one pound of bread, one pound of salt fish, two ounces of butter, one gill of oil, and one pound of potatoes: Saturday, one pound of bread, one pound of pork, half a pint of peas or beans, and four ounces of cheese. And there shall also be allowed, one half-pint of distilled spirits per day, or, in lieu thereof, one quart of beer per day, to each ration.

Two other steps, both related, were taken later in the century. The first involved the repeal of the law that required that Army privates be detailed, in turn, to be cook for a period of 10 days. This haphazard system had ensured digestive problems among the men for many years. The new law took effect on 29 January 1879 and gave the company commander more latitude in the choice of cooks. The second step was an 1884 recommendation by the Inspector General that each company enlist two professional cooks and that each post have a professional baker on duty. In 1887 the Inspector General recommended that one man per company be enlisted with the sole duty of cooking. Finally, in 1899 Congress authorized two enlisted cooks with sergeant's pay for each company or battery. It was the duty of the recruiter to determine the cook's qualifications.

The Navy took similar steps to introduce cooks and suitable messhalls. The Secretary of the Navy noted that one of the most important measures was

the thorough ventilation of vessels by suitable apparatus, such as has been introduced on board the Richmond. . . . This apparatus has been fully tested, and the results obtained are of the most gratifying character. . . .

It is suggested that the system of cooking and rationing may be improved by the adaptation of a plan in universal use in the passenger ships crossing the Atlantic, where food is prepared and served by a special force, thus relieving the crew from this species of drudgery and securing better cooking than can be had from men not specially trained in the art. . . . Of still more importance is it that the restrictive dietary of the sailor be made as savory and as acceptable as possible, which is scarcely practicable under the system of selecting temporary cooks from the crew, as is done in the Navy. The large number of diseases of the digestive organs so common on shipboard are in part due to this cause.

All in all, the culinary torture that the soldier and sailor had suffered with bilious fortitude had come to an end. Today there is little doubt that the enlisted diet is the finest military fare in the world. Nutritionally it is superb, and its preparation is often little short of that.

The end of 1880 and early part of 1881 brought other welcome changes. The soldier's uniform had long been objectionable because of its unsuitability for the differing climatic environments in which men had to serve. The uniform was so uncomfortable in summer that the issue of the heavy gray flannel shirt was discontinued. Helmets were substituted for the dress cap, cork summer helmets were issued to those in warm climates, and efforts were made to have the uniforms fitted to the soldier. Other changes involved the introduction of sports. The men were encouraged to engage in lacrosse, football, and baseball. Possibly most important of all, the concept of the dayroom where soldiers could congregate during their off-duty hours was introduced. The first such facility was opened on 29 November 1880 at Vancouver Barracks, Oregon. It consisted of a reading room, a game room, and a lunch room. These were all decorated in an attractive manner to give a homelike atmosphere. Officers viewed the plan as a practical and valuable solution to a long-recognized need in the Army--that of providing the men with some satisfying outlet to substitute for hard liquor and gambling.

One of the major shortcomings in early military times was the type of medical care given the sick and wounded. In part, the unsanitary conditions reflected the general state of medicine, but the services were guilty of giving inadequate attention to medical care per se.

The sick and wounded of the Revolutionary Army were crowded together in hospitals plagued by indescribable filth. The straw bedding remained unchanged as one after another wounded or sick soldier died and was replaced by yet another patient. When the soldier did recover enough to walk, he was turned out because there was too little food. As the convalescent wandered the roads hungry and sick, few people offered to help because of fear of contamination. Also, the community objected to the filth and stench that the hospital created.

The wars of 1812 and 1846 as well as the numerous Indian wars saw little improvement. The situation might have remained the same during the Civil War except for the well-publicized exploits of Florence Nightingale in the Crimea.

Statistics show that the Civil War soldier had roughly one chance in four of not returning home (the data show that the Korean War GI had one chance in 126, and these odds were even higher for the Vietnamese War). Overshadowing the whole system was the abysmal recruiting system in which whole regiments might arrive on duty without a single man having been given a physical examination. Indeed, one estimate shows that three-quarters of the soldiers who were discharged should never have been enlisted at all.

Fortunately for the American soldier, the sufferings of the French, British, and Russian soldiers in the Crimean War were well known through the work of Florence Nightingale. It was social pressure (as in the case of flogging) that forced official attention to the necessity for proper care and facilities. The causative agent was the formation of such groups as Women's Central Association of Relief for the Sick and

Wounded of the Army. This agency and others like it descended on Washington and demanded the formation of a Civilian Sanitary Commission. The realization by official Washington that the American people would not countenance a repetition of the gruesome horrors in Crimea led to the formation of the Civilian Sanitary Commission of 9 June 1861. The Commission's White Paper of September 1861 prompted the dismissal of the Surgeon General (a holdover from the War of 1812) and the reorganization of the medical corps of the Army.

By the end of the war, a competent system for the evacuation of the wounded existed, and the ambulance corps had been established in 1864. "The Angels of the Battlefield convinced everybody--even the doctors--that the female did the best job in caring for the sick and infirm, thereby, almost overnight catapulting the status of the nurse from pesthouse attendant to a lady of healing." The practical effect was that the Army established a corps of nurses.

The long-term effect of better medical care was, however, that it exacerbated the tooth-to-tail question. Given certain resources, now the Army had to consider what proportion had to be allocated to the care of the wounded, a task which, for all practical purposes, had been left to civilian agencies at the beginning of the war.

Today we cannot help but marvel at the wonders--even near medical miracles--that today's system of helicopters and mobile hospitals makes possible. The modern enlisted man has a quality of life that in 1776 would have been considered unbelievable. Importantly, constant efforts are being made to improve it.

III. PAY

The soldier should not have any ready money. If he has a few coins in his pocket, he thinks himself too much of a great lord to follow his profession, and he deserts at the opening of the campaign.

Frederick the Great, 1747

Modern research into the pay of military personnel has tended more and more in the direction of making military pay comparable to civilian pay. In this pursuit of comparability, two ideas tend to be stressed, one consciously by researchers, the other unconsciously.

The conscious idea is equality of the total pay package with comparable civilian jobs so as to encourage enlisted personnel to make the military a career. Here the researchers rightly point out that unless the totality of pay and benefits is perceived by the enlisted man as being equal to what his skills will bring on the civilian market, he has strong incentives to leave the service. Hence, precious time and money would be spent on training new individuals over and above what an equitable pay would cost. In other words, the process would not be cost-effective.

The unconscious idea is that the researchers, most of whom are economists, tend to emphasize "skill" and try to make the military pay system conceptually like the civilian pay system. Skill, in this conceptualization, is generally equated with brains. However, the equation overlooks a fundamental reality of the soldier's life.

Part of the soldier's "skill" is that some must die in battle. Men in the combat arms of the Army, according to historical statistics, run a greater risk than, say, the ordnance or the signal corps. Yet, the ordnance and signal corps are more "skilled" and should, therefore, receive more pay. However, are they more "skilled" at dying? Not according to the statistics. So the question arises: For which "skill" do you pay the ordinary infantryman--his relatively "low" skills (in comparison with the technical branches) required to make him a competent soldier or his very high-risk skill of dying? Equally difficult problems face the Navy and the Air Force. All in all, this question is akin to the Gordian knot. The paragraphs that follow show some of the historical process of various proposals used to try to untie that knot.

By a resolve of 29 July 1775, Congress set the pay of a private soldier at six and two-thirds dollars a month and was annoyed that almost immediately a cry went up for a bounty. Congress was surprised at the outcry because the present pay was greater than a soldier had ever had. In fact, because of the mounting cost of the war, Congress would have preferred to lower the pay, particularly since the British soldier was payed only about a dollar and twenty cents a month.

There were good reasons for the soldier's desire for more money. These reasons were firmly rooted in the lack of provisions to assist the families of the soldiers. The family allotment was in the distant future, and soldiers' families had to fend for themselves in any way they could. There was precious little that could be done for the wives and children of the men at the front, and they were obliged to support themselves with meager assistance from their friends and neighbors. All

the work of the farms devolved upon them, and the soaring inflation made their plight steadily worse.

The pay problems were compounded by the lack of uniformity among the states. For example, Massachusetts intended to pay her militia on the basis of the lunar month instead of the calendar month. The lunar month is 29 days long, which meant that the Massachusetts militia would receive more pay than the Continentals. The effects of unequal pay for equal danger were succinctly stated by George Washington in a letter to the President of Congress. "It aims the most fatal stab to the peace of this army that ever was given, and . . . Lord North himself could not have devised a more effectual blow to the recruiting service." The Colonies finally accepted a pay period voted by Congress.

A more serious dissatisfaction arose over the difference in pay between the troops of the middle and northern Colonies. The middle states paid more than the New England states. Politically speaking, a state could not allow its citizens to be treated more poorly than those from another state. More importantly from the recruiting standpoint, the lower paying states found it difficult to raise their recruiting quotas. In a move that could have been expected, Congress made the pay of the middle-state soldiers the same as that of the New Englanders. Congress agreed with the New England states who "expected that the patriotism and laudable pride of the other colonies would not long permit them to accept higher wages than their neighbors for fighting in the same glorious cause and for the attainment of the same great and valuable object." This was a noble sentiment but hardly helped the soldier and his family to survive and, it must be assumed, affected the recruiting effort adversely.

The states continued to work at cross purposes. About a year later the State of Connecticut proposed to increase the pay of its soldiers to 20 shillings per month. Washington was so concerned about the adverse influence on the efficiency of the Army that he wrote to Congress protesting that the increase would have the worst effect on recruiting in other states; and that, even if men could be raised without learning of the Connecticut bounty, when the Army was formed, they must discover that it had been given. Inevitably, when the other troops "come to act with troops who receive a higher pay, jealousy, impatience, and mutiny will immediately take place, and occasion desertions, if not a total dissolution of the Army." The action would be "injurious and fatal. . . . That troops will never act together in the same cause and for different pay, must be obvious to everyone. Experience has already proved it in this Army."

Until very late in our history, pay, per se, was rarely considered as an incentive by Congress to induce men to enlist or to retain them on active duty except during wartime when a system of bounties to include free land was used. Indeed, until late in the 19th century enlisted men seemed to be considered a commodity to be bought on the market at the going rate--a rate, incidentally, that was generally lower than the rate for men in the civilian sector. During wartime, when the publication of casualty lists had the inevitable depressing effect on volunteer rates, supply and demand factors drove pay to higher limits.

The advent of huge citizen armies, created by the use of the draft for World Wars I and II, forced many into the armed forces against their will and at substantial losses in income. Many lawyers, engineers, and

other professional men were drafted and required to take drastic cuts in income. These people often had families to support, compounding the financial problems they had to undergo.

In these circumstances, pay of the enlisted men (and officers) came to be viewed in another light. It is a fair assumption that there was a gradual growth in the, as yet, unvoiced belief that if the country forced people to defend it, these people should at least have some of their financial hardships mitigated by equitable pay scales. It is true that many of the professional people who were drafted were ultimately urged to attend some form of officer training and were, as a consequence, commissioned. This meant that their pay scales were higher, and the degree of financial difficulty they experienced was markedly lessened. The enlisted men, however, were not so fortunate and continued to suffer.

Some relief was obtained during World War II in the form of the allotment: A portion of the soldier's pay was allotted to his family and sent directly to the family by the government. In addition, the government's practice of matching the allotment further lessened the financial problem.

Other pay provisions were legislated to compensate men who performed tasks that were considered dangerous, that is, tasks that were above the normal danger levels experienced in a profession which of itself had a high element of danger. Table 1 shows the initial date that various types of pay were introduced.

In reading Table 1 it should be remembered that the beginning date of each type of pay or incentive pay does not necessarily correspond with the date that the pay was authorized for all enlisted personnel.

Table 1

DATES OF INITIATION OF MILITARY PAY AND OTHER INCENTIVE PROGRAMS

Title	Date Initiated	Title	Date Initiated
Basic pay	1790	Demolition duty pay	1949
Disability retired pay	1790	Clothing maintenance allowance	1949
Enlistment bonus	1791	Leprosarium duty pay	1949
Reenlistment bonus	1791	Hostile fire pay	1952
Severance pay	1800	Survivor benefit plan	1953
Military exchanges (sutlers)	1806	Acceleration subject pay	1955
Subsistence	1808	Deceleration subject pay	1955
Sea duty pay	1835	Dislocation allowance	1955
Retired pay	1861	Low-pressure chamber pay	1955
Commissary stores	1866	Readjustment pay	1956
Military leave	1874	Dependents' medical care	1956
Diving duty pay	1886	Medical care for retirees	1956
Quarters allowance	1887	Social security	1956
Certain places pay	1900	Thermal experiment pay	1957
Submarine duty pay	1901	Dependency and indemnity comp.	1957
Death gratuity	1908	Proficiency pay	1958
Flight pay, crew member	1913	Unemployment compensation	1958
Inactive duty pay	1916	Responsibility pay	1958
Group insurance plan	1917	Self-propelled submersible pay	1960
Administrative duty pay	1920	Family separation allowance	1963
Personal money allowance	1922	High-pressure chamber pay	1963
Flight pay, noncrew	1934	Carrier flight deck pay	1965
Parachute duty pay	1941	Continuation pay for physicians	1967
Overseas station allowance	1942	Nuclear qualified officer pay	1969
Glider duty pay	1944	Aviation career incentive pay	1974
Mortgage insurance	1944	Incentive pay for physicians	1974
Physician, dentist pay	1947	Changes in basic pay	(a,b)

^aBasic pay in the 20th century had been changed by Congressional action at least 17 times before 1970. In the Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970, a mechanism was established that guarantees pay schedules comparable to those of industry. During periods of inflation, the act virtually guarantees a yearly increase.

^bOf the pay raises before 1970, one was in the first decade, one was in the second decade, four were in the fourth decade, three were in the fifth decade, and eight were in the sixth decade.

In general, most of those with dates after the beginning of the 20th century were for both officer and enlisted personnel. On the other hand, retirement benefits were first given to officers, and it took another 30 years before they were awarded to enlisted personnel. Even then, retired pay was first awarded to enlisted men in the Army and the Marine Corps. It was much later before it was given to enlisted men in the Navy and then only after numerous protests. Equality came in 1922 when Congress established uniform pay scales and equivalent rank tables. After that date, all services received the same entitlements, and all enlisted men received whatever the special incentive pay might be.

The layman is frequently at a loss to understand the emotions generated in the military by the attempts to delete allowances that have become entitlements through various pay legislation. The point is historic in nature and the product of several considerations.

First, the system of allowances is older than the United States itself. It can be said to have begun with the Continental Congress and with the very earliest acts of the United States Congress. Clothing, food, and medical care were provided by the Continental Congress, although the actual receipt of these services was very often far less than was intended by the Congress or expected by the soldiers. In addition, the United States Congress very quickly confirmed the concept of allowances. The Act of 30 April 1790 established pay for the troops in Section 5, additional pay for certain positions in Section 6, money instead of forage in Section 8, uniform clothing for enlisted men in Section 9, and "the following rations or the value thereof" in Section 10. Enlisted men have always been recipients of the system of pay and allowances since the beginning of the Army.

The second important aspect of the pay and allowance system, and one that frequently escapes the notice of the critics, is that the soldier has no choice on where he will serve once he has enlisted. Thereafter, he must serve where the good of the service or the world situation demands. As a consequence, he frequently finds himself taking a real loss in purchasing power as he moves from one location to another. He expects, not unnaturally, increases in his allowances designed to make his condition of duty a constant purchasing power situation rather than one in which he is, in effect, forced to pay for the obligation of duty by virtue of his place of assignment. Over the years Congress has provided various types of allowances designed, in large part, to cover these types of situations.

The third aspect of an enlisted man's service is that he sometimes must perform duties that are by their very nature more hazardous than duties performed by other enlisted men and more hazardous than those required of civilians. In these circumstances, additional pay for hazardous duties is designed to make up for specific problems in obtaining insurance at rates similar to those given to the civilian community. For years, most insurance policies had a war exclusion clause that absolved the companies of the obligation to pay should an individual die as a result of hostile action. That this is a real consideration is generally apparent only to those who have been in the service, have a family to think of in the event of their death, and are trying to establish some sort of insurance estate to leave that family with sufficient means to live and to educate the children.

Given these considerations, it is small wonder that the periodic attempts to do away with the various "perks" that soldiers receive is greeted with uniform hostility. These entitlements have been achieved by the military community in a struggle with Congress that has gone on for a period of almost 200 years.

There is, however, another consideration in the granting of special pay entitlements--the requirements of the government itself. Here the considerations pertain to the marketplace and its effect on the supply of manpower. For instance, in the decade of the 1950s the services became aware that electronic mechanisms could substitute for manpower and might prove a potent force in the reduction of casualties in combat. As such electronic devices as improved radar, miniaturized radios, heat-detecting devices, and others of increasing complexity entered the military inventory, large numbers of electronic technicians had to be trained. Simultaneously, civilian life was being enriched by the introduction of electronic devices at an even faster rate than they were being introduced into the military arsenal. Therefore, the civilian sector began to tap the supply of already trained technicians. The brain drain was widespread and called for some sort of corrective action if military effectiveness was to be preserved. In this crisis, "proficiency pay" was the proposed answer.

The specific purpose of proficiency pay, a term coined by the Defense Advisory Committee on Professional and Technical Compensation of 1957 (The Cordiner Committee), was to provide an additional monthly payment as an incentive for soldiers with critical military skills to stay in the service, or as an inducement for qualified personnel to volunteer for duty outside their normal career field.

The principle was not a new one (the men to man the first steam engines on ships received higher pay), but the name was new and perhaps more descriptive. In any case, the Cordiner Committee recommended that especially proficient enlisted personnel be advanced in grade. In 1959 Congress went a step further and allowed the services to choose one of two methods: advancement in grade or the payment of up to \$150 per month to qualified enlisted personnel. The services selected the second method and eschewed the proficiency pay-grade method although it still remained law.

The proficiency pay program as implemented by the Department of Defense had three different categories of pay, each with its own objective, covering skill shortages, special duty assignments, and superior performance. The shortage specialty proficiency pay (SSPP) was designed to retain personnel with critically needed skills. That is, where retention of certain personnel was at so low a level as to jeopardize the readiness of the force, proficiency pay was recommended. Special duty assignment proficiency pay (SDAPP) was designed to encourage qualified personnel to engage in duties outside their normal career patterns. This would include such fields as recruiting, drill instructor, or career counselor. Superior performance proficiency pay (SPPP) was aimed at rewarding personnel who were outstanding in skills where they were not entitled to either of the other two categories of proficiency pay.

The concept of proficiency pay has been successful, and it continues with some refinements to be used to the present day. The SSPP and the SPPP were replaced by the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB),

which was enacted by Congress in 1974. SPPP has been discontinued, and SSPP is now used in the Navy for only two specialties, one of which is nuclear power, and for only one medical specialty in the Air Force.

Long overdue was the dislocation allowance authorized by the Career Incentive Act of 31 March 1955. In brief, it is evident (by all of those who have had to move frequently) that there is a considerable cost incurred in uprooting one household and establishing another. Following the example of foreign armies who had made provisions for such expenses, Congress authorized a dislocation allowance equal to one month's rental whenever married personnel were required to make a permanent change of station for the convenience of the government.

Over the years, flight pay has been a controversial subject, not so much because of the pay itself, but because it has occasionally been attacked in Congress for being paid to officers who were flying a limited number of hours per week and seemingly for the sole purpose of qualifying for flight pay. The authorization of the pay in the Act of 2 March 1913 was originally to officers only, entitling such officers (as were flying) to an increase of 35 percent in their pay and allowances. The Act of 18 July 1914 entitled Army personnel who were required to participate in regular and frequent aerial flight, or who held the rating of aviation mechanic, to a 50-percent increase in pay. The Act of 3 March 1915 extended the same entitlement to Navy and Marine Corps personnel. Flight pay (for officers) in compensation for the hazard of flying was replaced by aviation career incentive pay in 1974, a pure incentive to keep officers in the service and in the career of aviation.

The same concept of the incentive had been extended to enlisted personnel fifteen years earlier by the Career Compensation Act of 1949, which was based upon recommendations by the "Hook" Committee, which had been established to study the entire question of military pay. The Act of 1949 was later amended by the Career Incentive Act of 1955, which increased the rates for enlisted personnel and introduced longevity step increments. Witnesses emphasized the incentive nature of the act: "so long as these services must be staffed by volunteers the incentives offered must be enough to attract and retain the numbers required to maintain peak performance capabilities."

Nondisability retired pay for enlisted personnel is of relatively recent origin in comparison with that for officers. Although officer retired pay can be traced back to an act of 1855, enlisted personnel did not receive an entitlement to retired pay, nondisability, until the Act of 14 February 1885. The reason for the relatively slow progress of such legislation for enlisted men is fairly obvious. Until this century, enlisted men were considered to be hired help who could be hired and fired as the situation demanded.

Whereas officer retirement legislation was initially conceived (in the period before the Civil War) as a means for increasing the efficiency of the Army and the Navy by removing old and decrepit officers from duty, there was no such need for legislative action to remove enlisted personnel. Simple administrative mechanisms were available to the government: Reenlistment could be denied or the man could simply be discharged at the government's convenience by cutting the budget.

However, even when the Act of 1885 provided retired pay for enlisted men, it did so only for the Army and the Marine Corps. It authorized retirement after 30 years of service if the enlisted man requested the retirement and if it was approved by the service. The retired pay was fixed at 75 percent of the man's pay. The 30-year privilege was extended to all services by the Act of 3 March 1899. Finally, the Act of 2 March 1907 consolidated the retirement authority into one piece of legislation. On 6 October 1945, the retirement option was extended to reservists.

The legislation on retirement pay was generally written to provide that, when the active-duty force received a pay increase, the same increase be extended to retired personnel. This is the so-called recomputation principle, which became a specific issue (between the retired community and Congress) with the passage of the Act of 20 May 1958, which increased active-duty pay but prohibited recomputation, substituting, in its stead, a pay raise of 6 percent for retired personnel. Despite numerous protests from the retired community, the recomputation of retired pay was not permitted. Instead, the Uniformed Services Pay Act of 1963 enacted a permanent provision of the law, by which retired personnel receive a cost-of-living increase as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Initially, a cost-of-living increase would accrue if the CPI rose by 3 percent over the base index and stayed at that level, or higher, for three consecutive months. This provision (of the Act of 21 August 1965) was modified by adding an additional 1-percent "kicker" because it was believed that the delay in granting the CPI increase affected retirees adversely. The kicker was repealed

in 1976, and a simple annual increase (if the change in the CPI so warranted) was granted. That is where the system stands today, although at this writing Congress is studying the entire question of CPI increases. Quite naturally there have been repeated protests from the retired community and allegations of "breaking faith" for those who entered the service under one system only to find that, when they were eligible for retirement, another system was in effect.

It is unfortunate that critics of recomputation have been able to create the impression that the prime beneficiary of the system is the high-ranking officer. Actually, officers are but a small percentage of retirees. Enlisted men are more numerous and, because of pay differentials, their retired pay is less (although at the same percentage of base pay as for officers). Also, retired pay for enlisted personnel prior to the cessation of recomputation was small and often incapable of supporting them and one or more dependents. As of 1981 the average retired pay of an enlisted man was about \$8000 per year. These men are more bitter about the loss of recomputation than are the officers.

Reasons of space preclude discussion of all of the items contained in Table 1, but it is clear that most involve incentives of one sort or another to induce men to either continue on active duty or, being on active duty, to volunteer for some particular specialty. Furthermore, it is equally clear that pay scales in effect indicate a slow but certain realization (on the part of the nation) that a career enlisted force can only be obtained when pay, both actual and/or perceived, is competitive with civilian scales for given specialties. The Gordian

knot is still there, but measures have been taken to alleviate some of the contradictions involved as to which "skill" must be paid the highest.

IV. REQUIREMENTS

'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
did gyre and gimble in the wabe:
All mimsy were the borogroves,
and the mome raths outgrabe.
Beware the Jabberwock, my son!

"Jabberwocky," Lewis Carroll

The methods by which requirements for ground force personnel have been computed over the course of our history are rather obscure. Colonial period requirements seemed to be based on a desire to outnumber the enemy by a factor of two to one. The Mexican requirements seemed to have no rational basis. Civil War requirements seemed to have grown like topsy, while the Spanish-American War requirements were apparently founded on nothing more substantial than an effort to accommodate all those who wished to participate in an extremely popular war.

The Navy was, in some respects, more fortunate in coming to grips with manpower needs. Unlike the Army, where the man was the least common denominator for fighting, in the Navy the ship was the unit. Therefore, one could decide on the number of ships and man those ships by some formula based either on total guns or total tons. Both were used.

Similarly, Air Force requirements could be reduced to requirements for aircraft. Notwithstanding, major arguments and disagreements did, and still do, arise about aircraft types and quantities and manning requirements for support personnel (mechanics, communicators, engineers, and the like).

Early in its existence the Continental Congress had to face the question of how many troops it needed, and in arriving at the precise figure to reconcile that need with a chronic shortage of funds. The records are obscure as to the methodology used, but some insight is gained from speeches and writings of key members of Congress and of George Washington himself.

The British were thought to have 10,000 troops in the vicinity of Boston. This figure assumed importance when the Continental Congress first met on 10 May 1775 and began to study the papers submitted for its consideration. One of the most important of these was from Joseph Warren, acting President of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts:

We have passed an unanimous resolve for thirteen thousand six hundred men to be forthwith raised by this Colony; and proposals are made by us to the Congress of New Hampshire, and governments of Rhode Island and Connecticut Colonies for furnishing men in the same proportion. . . . Without a force, superior to our enemies, we must reasonably expect to become the victims of their relentless fury: with such a force we may still have hopes of seeing an immediate end put to the inhuman ravages of mercenary troops in America.

What Warren had done, along with the Provincial Congress, was to state the commonsense principle that American forces should be superior to those of our enemies. This principle was applied when Washington was given his orders as the Commander in Chief of the Army and was authorized to increase the strength of the Army around Boston to 20,000 men. Superiority over the enemy was translated into a two-to-one ratio by Washington because he felt the American troops were not as well trained as the British regulars.

Conspicuously absent from the Congressional planning factors was the artillery. A former imperial policy had made sure that there were almost no qualified artillerymen in America because that important arm had always been provided by the British regulars. Likewise, there were few cannons, although this shortage was solved in part by the following events. First was the capture of Fort Ticonderoga by Ethan Allen and the Green Mountain Boys and, along with it, 58 pieces of artillery. Second was Lord Howe's evacuation of Boston. The American cause was strengthened by the capture of 200 cannons, which were inexplicably left behind along with tons of gunpowder, an item in constant short supply in the Continental Army. The "requirement" for artillery became a simple one--whatever was available would be manned.

The records are equally unclear as to how the size of the force necessary to fight the War of 1812 was conceived. What we do know is that there were rumors in several states that the size of the British invasion force numbered 25,000 men. This large force had been released for the "unconditional submission" of the United States during a lull in the Napoleonic Wars. The new nation raised (excluding militia that came and went) 50,000 men, of which 35,000 were from the middle states and 15,000 from elsewhere in the new nation, with about 13,000 at the final Battle of New Orleans. The principle of twice the enemy strength had once again become the apparent operational requirement.

In concept, the Revolutionary planners could meet naval requirements from three somewhat less complicated approaches. First, one could consider the Navy as an aggregation of ships rather than as an aggregation of men. Force structuring amounted to determining the

number of warships (which one wanted to meet a certain known or perceived threat) and computing the required number of men to sail each ship, fight with it, and otherwise maintain it.

Second, one could determine the amount of money to be spent on manpower, knowing in advance the costs of sailing a vessel or having it in an inactive status. Once the number of men was determined, the planner could decide on the mix of vessels that the given number of men could man.

Third, one could pick some component of the fleet that was judged the single most important component needing a full complement. One then manned that particular function to strength and built the mix of vessels around that number.

Congress wavered among the available alternatives. Once the Navy was established in 1797, Congress began to reconsider the costs versus the risks that it saw and, on 3 March 1801, "approved a Naval Peace Establishment . . . providing the number of ships which should be kept in constant service, in time of peace, and that the residue should be laid up in ordinary, with a sailing-master, certain petty officers, seamen, and marines, attached to each vessel thus laid up." The President was authorized "to officer and man the vessel to be retained in actual service, as he might direct, limiting him, however, to two-thirds of the then present complement of seamen and ordinary seamen."

The Act of 21 April 1806 authorized the President

to keep in actual service, in time of peace, as many of the frigates and other armed vessels of the United States, as, in his judgement, the nature of the service might require . . . and the President was authorized to officer and man the public armed vessels in actual service in time of peace as he might direct; but the act just referred to limited the number of [officers]; it limited, too, the number of able seamen, ordinary seamen, and boys, to nine hundred and twenty-five.

In 1807, an additional "number of able seamen, ordinary seamen, and boys, not exceeding five hundred [were authorized] should the exigency of the public service require it." Subsequent acts of 31 January 1809, 28 June 1809, 2 January 1813, and 3 March 1813 added more ships and men to meet the impending and actual needs of the War of 1812. After this war, Congress reconsidered its actions once more and came to an interesting conclusion:

Although, by the Constitution of the United States, the President is commander in chief of the army and navy, yet it belongs to Congress to "raise and support" the one, and "to provide and maintain" the other; the power to provide and maintain implies that of determining the quantum; a question the decision of which ought not to be left, in the opinion of your committee, to the Executive Department; and yet, in practice, it is in effect left to Executive decision, for, as has been before remarked, there being no permanent law in force limiting the number of officer, ships, or men, to be kept in service, the limitation is in the amount of appropriation; and your committee believe, that, in practice, the amount of the estimates has generally been appropriated without any discussion in Congress as to the necessity of them.

The Congressional Committee having decided that something was wrong with the system, as it then existed, decided to introduce its own units of measure:

if the number of seamen be fixed, no more vessels will be employed than they can man; and the fixing a certain maximum of seamen is considered a more judicious course than to fix the number of ships, inasmuch as the President will then be left at liberty to use such classes of vessels as may, in his opinion, be best adapted to the nature of the service; the aggregate of the guns, however, being limited by the number of men allowed to man them.

The Committee believed that it would be illogical to man the Navy during peace at the same levels it was manned during war. It recommended that a new manning rule be adopted:

The total number of guns of our ships, which are built, equipped, and launched (which description excludes the three line of battle ships Ohio, North Carolina, and Delaware, which are believed not to be equipped) amounts to seven hundred and ninety-seven, of all classes of vessels, gun-boats included. [There should be] a sufficient number of commissioned and warrant officers to officer all these upon the war establishment . . . it would [also] afford a liberal peace establishment. . . . As to the seamen . . . the whole force of vessels of war in the actual service of the United States amounts to about three hundred and thirty-five guns.

This number of guns the Committee deemed excessive and, by eliminating certain vessels, it brought the number of ships it felt to be a reasonable force (thereby also limiting the total force) to 275 actually in being. Then the Committee used the manning tables prescribed for each of the ships and calculated the number needed to man the guns with enlisted personnel. Thus,

to man this force upon a war establishment, if the Committee have not erred in calculation, would require 856 able seamen, 802 ordinary seamen, and 195 boys; to this add . . . for ships in ordinary, navy yards, and navy stations, 297 able seamen, 314 ordinary seamen, and 67 boys; and the aggregate is of able seamen 1,143, of ordinary seamen 1,116, and boys, 262.

The total force would then amount to 2932 enlisted personnel for a total reduction of 411 men. The Committee then resolved that "a naval peace establishment ought to be fixed by law."

The Committee was advocating here what has now become known as the sliding-scale principle, which in its simplest form implies that the qualifications of officers are essentially superior to those of soldiers, and are more difficult to acquire. The new Congressional rules tied strength to guns and gave enough officers to man the guns at wartime strengths for all the guns in the fleet, whether in commission

or in ordinary, but would only man the guns in commission during peacetime with sufficient enlisted men to service them. At various times in the future, the rules would change again.

Another computational idea arose after the Spanish-American War. It began with the General Board (the Navy's rough equivalent of a General Staff) receiving a directive from the Secretary of the Navy, 21 September 1903, which asked, "considering those warships in commission and those authorized or on the ways 'and assuming such strength for navy as was to the Board essential to the interests of the country, what type of vessels and what number of each type, are necessary?'"

The Board's proposal, called the "general Naval scheme," was for a fleet of 48 battleships. The governing idea was to outnumber logical enemies in capital ships, which in that era meant battleships. The proposal read:

This number--48 and the date set for the fleet to be completed--before 1920--were not fixed from any sentimental reasons for the number of states as to numbers [battleships were named after states], or any random time as to date, but from a calm, logical review of the policies and aims of the nation, and of the known prospective developments and aims of other countries. The policy was to provide and maintain at all times a fleet equal or superior to that of any nation likely to challenge our policies, to the end that such a challenge might be prevented and peace insured.

Although the administration rejected the number of battleships recommended by the General Board, by 1907 it agreed to accept the recommendation for the supporting ships that the General Board believed necessary:

In its long range building program the board recommended that for every two battleships the navy should have one armored cruiser, three protected cruisers, four scout cruisers, three destroyers, and two colliers; and that for each squadron of

eight battleships the navy should have one ammunition supply ship, one repair and torpedo depot ship, one tanker, two transports, and one hospital ship.

But Congress would not agree to the proposal. It approved funds for only three scout cruisers and 20 destroyers. Moreover, it appropriated money for two battleships instead of the one that President Roosevelt thought was necessary for replacement purposes. In the President's last year in office, Congress approved two more battleships.

The effect on requirements was obvious. People were talking about three fleets: the one the Navy wanted, the one the President wanted, and the one for which Congress was willing to appropriate money. Two of these fleets changed from time to time, depending on the national political situation. It is small wonder, in this climate of ambiguity, that the personnel requirements situation was, at best, confused and, at worst, chaotic. Only one thing was clear--whichever fleet one had in mind, there were not enough enlisted personnel to man the ships.

The President was aware of the shortage and, year after year, he notified Congress that more men were needed. As its wont, Congress demurred but finally recognized that a problem existed. In 1902 the President flatly stated that there was an alarming shortage of officers and men and those on the rosters of the Navy amounted to only half of those needed to man the ships now in commission and under construction. Thus, by 1909, the number of enlisted men had increased to 44,500 (from 15,050 in 1901).

There was even talk of allowing enlisted personnel to become officers, both as a morale factor for the men and because of the need for junior officers to man the ships. However, little came of this

idea. Enlisted men were not attracted to the program because the so-called Mustangs found themselves ignored by their fellow officers. Enlisted personnel, however qualified, were not thought to be gentlemen and, as revealed in an article written in 1901, the officer corps was not free of snobbery:

To be a good ship's cook requires talent, and to be a good lieutenant requires years of special education. Jacky cannot man the coal whips, scrub decks, pull oars in the boats, clean the bright work, attend to his multifarious drills and exercises, do his trick at the helm, stand his watch and simultaneously secure the necessary knowledge to be a lieutenant any more than, by the same means, he can acquire the artistic inspiration which evolves the toothsome plum-duff and the ultra-satisfying pea soup. . . . The forecastle, on the other hand, is not a school of manners. Individuals there residing may have higher innate graces of refinement than are found on many quarter decks; but we are not dealing with individuals, but with the enlisted man as a type.

There was another area of disagreement. Even if one agreed to approve more enlisted men for the Navy, how many more were needed? To be sure, the men for the ships could be estimated fairly accurately by totaling the number of posts in each ship that had to be manned, multiplied by the number of watches needed, multiplied by the total number of ships, and then aggregating the totals. However, there was no easy way to estimate numbers when it came to shore establishment personnel, the men in the pipeline, the sick, the lazy, the deserters, and men required for the hundreds of housekeeping jobs to keep the fleet at sea.

The best estimate seemed to be one based on tonnages of the ships. One writer on the subject was mainly concerned with the requirements for officers, to be calculated by tonnages. "As far as the men are concerned," he went on,

the only question is the ratio of the total number to the total tons of shipping . . . the ratio of 60 per 1000 tons, or 20 men per officer. In the House Report on the current Naval Appropriation Bill, the numbers estimated for 1908 are 59,874. The total of the present authorized shipping, which includes the ships of the House estimate, is 946,000 tons. The ratio is then 63 per 1000 tons. The table accompanying the House Report gives the ratios in foreign services as varying from 50 to 75. Hence it will be entirely reasonable to adopt 60 as the authorized ratio. At this ratio the present strength should be 56,760. It is actually 37,000. The law should allow enlistments as necessary with 60 per 1000 tons as the limit.

Just before World War I, new controversial ideas were also advanced for ground force requirements. At issue was the increase in the National Guard from 100,000 to 425,000 men. The national debate that arose before our entry into World War I was a potpourri of preparedness concerns, political infighting between the Republicans and Democrats, the conflicting views of the Army and the National Guard as to their respective roles, and the realities of the Mexican situation: the Navy shelled Veracruz and the Army was in pursuit of Pancho Villa.

One of the major results of the debate was the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916, the most comprehensive military legislation to that date. This important Act formally established the last part of the triad for national defense policy by creating a comprehensive reserve structure. By its terms, the Army of the United States was formed from the "Regular Army, the Volunteer Army, the Officer's Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, the National Guard while in the service of the United States, and such other forces as are now or may hereafter be authorized by law."

The size of the Regular Army was fixed at 175,000 men to be reached by increasing the existing army in five increments over a period of five years. It was to be expansible to 286,000 men in time of war.

The Act also introduced a new basis for an increase in the strength of the National Guard. This basis was a strange concept of requirements as we understand that term today. Whereas today the services state their manpower and a cost-effectiveness rationale for the numbers or dollars required, Section 62 of the Act set the number of National Guard enlisted men as follows:

The number of enlisted men of the National Guard to be organized under this Act within one year from its passage shall be for each State in the proportion of two hundred men for each Senator and Representative in Congress from such State, and a number to be determined by the President for each Territory and the District of Columbia, and shall be increased each year thereafter in the proportion of not less than fifty per centum until a total peace strength of not less than eight hundred enlisted men for each Senator and Representative in Congress shall have been reached.

A simple computation shows that for the 96 senators and 435 representatives at the time, there would be a total of 424,800 enlisted personnel.

The National Defense Act of 1916 also had another useful effect on the requirements process. The initial requirements for men were fairly straightforward. When war was declared, the administration made two propositions to Congress: to bring the Regular Army and the National Guard to the strength called for by the Act, and to raise an additional force in increments of 500,000 by the draft with the first increment being raised immediately.

This was the first time in our military history that the nation had a clear-cut idea of how many troops it might need and a reason for that need at the outset of a war. Now the problem was to determine the number of troops needed to sustain the war and win it. To that end,

General Pershing was sent to France three weeks before the 1st Division (the Big Red One) arrived so that he could prepare for the arrival of the Army that he was to command. In addition, he was to gather information that would allow the War Department to calculate the requirement for divisions and from that, of course, would follow the requirement for troops.

General Pershing's extensive consultation with our allies led him to conclude that the French and English armies were in deplorable condition. The French had experienced the mutinies arising out of the disastrous Nivelle Offensive as well as the blood bath at Verdun. They showed Pershing lists of divisions that could not be restored to strength for lack of resources. The remaining divisions were obviously low in morale and of questionable effectiveness. The British Army was bogged down in Flanders and was suffering severe casualties that would be difficult to replace, even with the resources of England's huge empire. Given this grim recital of depleted and rapidly dwindling resources, Pershing concluded that the United States must send a full army of 20 divisions and supporting troops because this was "the smallest unit which in modern war will be a complete, well-balanced fighting organization." Moreover, only a million Americans in France could defeat the Germans, and that million "should not be construed as representing the maximum force which should be sent to or which will be needed in France. . . . Plans for the future should be based . . . on three times this force, i.e., at least three million men. Such a program of construction should be completed within two years."

The organization of the proposed force was based upon the combat experience of the French and British. Pershing noted that the details

of the organization advocated by these allies differed to some extent, but the proportions of the different arms were measurably the same in both projects. The artillery arm was the most striking example. Despite the two systems' inherent differences, the total number of guns recommended per thousand infantry differed by only a very small fraction, and the proportion of different calibers of guns did not vary by much. In Pershing's words, "The amount of artillery, troops, and services required to maintain the infantry actually carrying on the battle or manning the trenches is very striking, but these auxiliaries are necessary and have resulted from actual experience of nearly three years. The French and British recommend practically identical proportions."

The requirements stated by General Pershing were obviously based on military judgmental factors. However, these factors were pragmatic rules of thumb that had been applied by the British and French (and probably by the Germans, if access had been available to their plans and planners). As such, the factors had an unassailable basis: They had worked in combat and, while they had not assured victory, they had certainly prevented defeat, at least up to that time.

Military aviation requirements did not find a guiding principle in World War I other than that there was a need for 4500 aviators and 50,000 mechanics. This number was apparently an unquestioned request from the French. Instead of an independent analysis, efforts were set in motion to meet the French goal as rapidly as possible. There was much popular enthusiasm, and the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps undertook a huge program which it pursued practically independently for a year. Its failure afforded an early and striking object lesson to the

General Staff of the necessity to formulate the military program and to coordinate the activities of the various agencies concerned.

The outcome of the Pershing proposals and the French request for air personnel was the so-called 30-division program. There was confusion about the size of divisions because between the time the program was conceived and the end of the war, the number increased from a contemplated 18,922 men to a recommended (by Pershing) 25,484 men to the final size (in November 1918) of 28,105 men.

World War II requirements were derived by the same kinds of military considerations used by General Pershing. The numbers were simply larger and were based on the threat from both Germany and Japan. In the final analysis, the Armed Forces totaled 12,123,455 men, of whom 8,267,958 were assigned to the Army of the United States and the Army Air Corps, 3,380,817 were assigned to the Navy, and 474,080 to the Marines. Of the Army's total, 7,376,295 were enlisted men. By way of contrast, at the end of 1939 there were 175,353 enlisted men.

Modern requirements for forces are supposedly based on analytic cost-effectiveness considerations. Whether or not they are, the process is complex as it must take into account the force level requested by the service, the force level agreed upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for presentation to the Secretary of Defense, the programmed force approved by the Secretary of Defense for presentation to Congress and, finally, the force for which Congress has appropriated funds. In this morass of numbers, it is still obscure how the final budget figure is derived analytically.

V. DESERTION

We need shooters, not
tooters.

A. P. Hill

Desertion is obviously allied to the requirements for men: What the recruiter provides, the deserter takes away. It has been a problem from the very beginning of our armed forces. Table 2 indicates the extent of the problem in the second half of the 19th century.

There is evidence that the recruiter was partially responsible for desertion. As of 1836, enlisted men alleged that recruiters did not tell them the whole truth about what to expect in the Army. "Many were told . . . they would have nothing to do but to ride on horseback over the country, to explore the western prairies and forests, and indeed, spend their time continually in delightful and inspiring occupations." In this case, when the recruit reached his unit, a regiment of mounted dragoons, he found that life was less than delightful. Many men elected to desert rather than face the harsh and grim fate of a soldier on the Western frontier.

In the early days of the armed forces, desertion tended to be high because of lack of training and discipline and a certain naivete on the part of some Revolutionary soldiers. Most of them were farmers who had come to do a specific job. When they deemed the job done, and the needs of their family called, they left, perhaps without thought that they

Table 2
ARMY AND NAVY DESERTION RATES,
1867-1895

Fiscal Year	Percent Deserted	
	Army	Navy ^a
1867	26.0	
1868	16.4	
1869	9.5	
1870	9.4	12.0
1871	32.6	
1872	31.7	
1873	29.1	
1874	17.3	
1875	10.8	
1876	6.9	14.3
1877	11.5	12.7
1878	7.0	10.3
1879	7.9	
1880	8.4	8.8
1881	10.0	
1882	15.8	
1883	15.2	
1884	15.0	
1885	11.7	
1886	8.5	7.3
1887	9.1	9.0
1888	9.0	13.1
1889	11.1	8.9
1890	9.3	12.0
1891	6.2	17.9
1892	5.5	17.0
1893	6.6	15.7
1894	4.1	
1895	4.6	

^aNavy data are not available
for all years.

were deserting. Many recruits, however, deserted intentionally, for example, to get additional bounties under assumed names or for other reasons to be discussed below.

After the Revolution, the causes for desertion varied but tended to center on three factors: the two foremost were liquor and general dissatisfaction with the service, and the third was in reaction to tyrannical commanding officers and their brutal punishment and treatment of the men. When 194 deserters, who were in Leavenworth Prison about 1900, were queried as to the reasons for their desertion, 42 listed general dissatisfaction, 67 blamed liquor problems, 14 simply said "trouble," 9 listed sickness, 6 claimed innocence of the charges, 9 were homesick, 21 cited tyrannical superiors, 14 gave no reason, one said he was going to get married, and another complained about food. The general dissatisfaction category contained such complaints as fear of punishment, debt, overwork, women, and "shunned by comrades."

There was also a correlation between pay and the desertion rate, and between the state of the economy and desertion. When the Regular Army base pay was cut from \$16 to \$13 per month for privates, "hosts of men deserted."

The state of the economy operated in two ways. During the depression of the 1870s, the desertion rate dropped. Conversely, when civilian pay scales exceeded those of the troops, desertion mounted. This was particularly true in the West where the scarcity of labor made pay scales higher than in the East. For example, during the spring when the railroads resumed their construction activities, soldiers deserted in large numbers.

Other causes of desertion centered on the loneliness and drabness of the soldier's life and fear of danger in future operations, or, in some cases, cowardice. When companies of the 23rd Infantry were

assembled to launch a campaign against the hostile Utes in May 1880, it was found at roll-call that one-third of the command had deserted the morning after arriving at the rendezvous.

Whatever the causes, during the remainder of the century desertion continued to plague the Army, which found itself unable to cope with the problem. Not until the mid-20th century did the Army arrive at a partial solution by making it easy for the commander, during peacetime, to discharge those who were troublemakers and/or were clearly dissatisfied with army life, or were psychologically unsuited for the service. The desertion problem was not thus resolved; it was merely finessed.

The conduct of black troops in the two cavalry and two infantry regiments, however, stands out as exemplary. The chaplain of the 25th Regiment noted in 1877 that black soldiers were conscious of representing their race: "They are possessed of the notion that the colored people of the whole country are more or less affected by their conduct in the Army." Thus, while the white regulars were generally objects of contempt by the white community, "lithographs of black soldiers in action hung in the homes of blacks as symbols of a better day." Blacks "had little, at the turn of the century, to help sustain our faith in ourselves except the pride that we took in the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry, the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry."

The Army was not alone in suffering from desertion. At times, almost an entire ship's complement would desert from the Navy. In 1871, the captain of the Tennessee reported that 51 members of his crew had deserted during two weeks at the New York Navy Yard, while another officer complained that his ship's boat "would go and the men would leap

out and run. If the officer followed, the whol Boat' [sic] crew would likely desert." See Table 3.

In some cases the problem was no doubt due to a particular commander whose cruelty drove men to desert. For instance, General Order No. 168 of 6 January 1872 finds Commander Alexander A. Semmes guilty of charges of "cruel and unlawful punishment of persons under his command," "abuse of his official power," and "oppressive and inhuman conduct." The Commander was sentenced, in part, to be suspended from "duty and rank for three years." Yet General Order No. 221 of 9 January 1877 finds the same man, now promoted to Captain, guilty of "compelling seamen, in double irons to stand up all day."

Even a general amnesty for sailors was of little use in stemming

Table 3
DESERTIONS OF NAVY ENLISTED MEN, 1870-1893
(Selected years)

Year	Desertions	Strength	Percent
1870	1081	9011	12.0
1876	1203	8400	14.3
1877	818	6466	12.7
1878	669	6505	10.3
1880	612	7648	8.0
1886	609	8360	7.3
1887	773	8771	9.0
1888	1121	8587	13.1
1889	749	8391	8.9
1890	931	7757	12.0
1891	1388	7737	17.9
1892	1360	7980	17.0
1893	1259	8043	15.7

the flow of desertions. General Order No. 185 of 13 December 1873

states:

The President of the United States commands it to be made known that all sailors and Marines who have deserted the Naval Service, and who shall, on or before the first day of February 1874, surrender themselves at any Naval Station, shall receive a full pardon, only forfeiting the pay and allowances due them; and shall be restored to duty without trial or punishment on condition that they faithfully serve out the full term of their enlistment unfulfilled at the time of their desertion.

In 1907 the desertion rate in the Army dropped to 5.6 percent. The Adjutant General believed

that the reasons for the decrease are not difficult to find. The reestablishment of the United States Military Prison at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, early in 1906, made it possible to resume the practice of sending long-term military convicts to undergo their terms of confinement at hard labor in that institution, and to abandon the practice that was necessarily adopted when the military prison was turned over to the Department of Justice in 1895 of permitting such convicts to serve their terms at military posts. Undoubtedly, the knowledge that convicted deserters will be compelled to undergo the rigors of prison discipline and to suffer the stigma of prison confinement, instead of being permitted to serve their terms, with more comfort, less disrepute, and greater chances for escape, among their former comrades in the much more congenial surroundings at military posts, has deterred many would-be deserters from taking the step that they would have been ready enough to take if they had seen no severer punishment before them, in the event of their capture, than a comparatively short term of confinement at some military post.

Another personnel action may also have had its effect. Before the publication of War Department Circular No. 41, dated 26 July 1906, applicants were enlisted at the recruiting station. After 26 July 1906, would-be enlistees were not enlisted at the recruiting stations but were sent instead to depots for processing and for the formal act of

enlistment. During fiscal year 1907, a total of 1192 such applicants either failed to report to the depot or left the depots before formally signing their papers. The Adjutant General's report for that year noted that

If all those elopements are added to the reported number of desertions, the percentage will be increased from 5.6 to 7, a percentage that is higher than that for any fiscal size of the Army in 1898. It appears, therefore, that the decrease in the percentage of desertions during the past fiscal year was due, in part at least, to the elimination of many prospective deserters . . . by delaying enlistments until after the arrival of the applicant at a recruit depot or depot post.

The Adjutant General dispelled a commonly held belief that "foreigners" deserted at higher rates than native Americans. He found that the desertion rates for the two groups were the same as their proportionate strength in the Army. On the other hand, he confirmed that there are more desertions in summer than in winter (see Table 4).

Table 4
ARMY DESERTIONS BY MONTH, 1905-1907

Month	Fiscal Year		
	1907	1906	1905
July	573	713	737
August	575	718	737
September	438	613	611
October	348	519	602
November	304	440	493
December	242	444	348
January	236	337	379
February	239	340	300
March	320	388	511
April	408	583	558
May	445	613	701
June	394	550	556
Total	4522	6258	6533

A careful reading of the reports shows that the Adjutant General overlooked as one possible cause the relationship between the pay of a soldier and what he might make outside the Army. Whereas the soldier's pay had been stabilized for many years at \$13 per month, he could make that much in a week or two (at most) as a common laborer. If he had special skills, he could make much more. It is instructive, therefore, to compare desertion rates with unemployment rates to demonstrate the ease with which a soldier (who had a mind to desert) could find a job in the public sector.

Table 5 shows a steady decline in the rate of desertion between 1900 and 1917, but it also shows that when the unemployment rate was high the desertion rate tended to be low. It can be inferred, without the necessity of a statistical regression, that there is a correlation between desertion rates and unemployment rates. This does not by itself establish causality. It does show, however, that the same factors are at work in both cases, whatever those factors may be. In other words, it is clear from the data that prospective deserters did take into account the state of the national economy before they made their final decision.

The problem of recruitment and requirements was complicated by the high desertion rates at the turn of the century, after the Spanish-American War had ended. That the Navy was very conscious of the problem is highlighted by the fact that three articles about desertion appeared in the Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute in the years 1904 and 1905.

Table 5

ARMY DESERTION RATES VERSUS NATIONAL
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES, 1900-1917
(In percent)

Year	Desertion	Unemployment
1900	4.0	5.0
1901	4.1	2.4
1902	5.0	2.7
1903	7.1	2.6
1904	6.6	4.8
1905	6.8	3.1
1906	7.4	0.8
1907	5.6	1.8
1908	4.6	8.5
1909	5.0	5.2
1910	3.7	5.9
1911	2.3	6.2
1912	3.0	5.2
1913	4.2	4.4
1914	3.1	8.0
1915	3.2	9.7
1916	3.1	4.8
1917	1.9	4.8

NOTE: The dates and unemployment figures are by calendar year. Desertion rates are by fiscal year, which during that period began in July of the preceding year. Therefore, the desertion rate for fiscal year 1907 reflects the rate for the last half of calendar year 1906 and the first half of calendar year 1907.

One writer blamed the "appalling number of desertions" on the laxity of authorities who treat deserters with

such leniency as to cause its binding effect [the oath of enlistment] to be lost on them. . . . [Others] see men who have deserted, apprehended, tried, convicted, sentenced and after serving part of the sentence, restored to duty: or restored to duty at the expiration of the term of imprisonment. Worse still, they see violators who surrender themselves punished as for some slight infraction of orders.

Another writer had a variety of explanations, many of which echoed the Army's views discussed earlier: "To describe the naval career as one prolonged yachting trip to 'the four quarters of the globe' and not to tell of the principal restrictions imposed by the ship's discipline is to invite ultimate condemnation by a recruit who has enlisted under a misconception." Other explanations included the breaking of promotion promises, the enlistment of low-quality men, the repeal of the law allowing short-term enlistments for special purposes, the harshness of service life, and the paucity of pay. The complaints about pay were compounded by the fact that the sailor's pay was withheld from him by regulation, presumably because the sailor was incapable of handling his own financial affairs. For example, one writer recalls,

I have known a chief petty officer, with several hundred dollars on the books, to be accused of lying and attempting to obtain money under false pretenses, because he asked to be allowed to draw \$25 to send his wife. In that instance his request was granted, but only on condition that the amount asked for should be paid in the form of a check, endorsed to his wife's order and given to the executive officer to mail.

Can any officer doubt that many self-respecting mechanics would be deterred from enlisting by knowledge that they might be exposed to such humiliation? . . . If we aim at naval efficiency, we must man our navy with vigorous, self-respecting young Americans, men who will cheerfully submit to the demands of the most rigid discipline but who will not submit to the denial of natural and legal rights which are perfectly consistent with such discipline.

The writer concludes that

After the most exhaustive analysis of causes, and after all causes susceptible of removal have been done away with, a certain percentage of desertion must still be looked for, due to special circumstances, special temptations, or special pressure. Thus, as not infrequently happens, a ship's company will buy a ticket to a remote point for an objectionable character, will escort him to the railway station and politely

request him never to show his face on board the Hackmatack again; or every now and then we must "chercher la femme," or we must not be surprised by the flocking of foolish youth to El Dorado when a new Klondyke or a new Kimberly is discovered just abaft the beam.

Another writer, with a penchant for statistics, agreed with the others as to the reasons for desertion and added that the frequent changes of ships produced a feeling of homelessness in men. This writer grouped men by the jobs they held to determine if desertion rates were affected by occupation. His data are shown in Table 6.

Table 6 shows that three ratings comprised 1528 desertions of a total of 3220 or 47.5 percent. Almost half the desertions were in a small group of ratings representing the most menial type of work. It is evident that work conditions and the self-esteem of the sailor were important factors to be considered in any overall attempt to solve the desertion problem.

Table 6
NAVY DESERTIONS BY RATING

Rating	Number	Desertions	Percent
Seaman	15,751	1,208	7.67
Artificer	1,627	88	5.40
Engine Room Force	8,173 ^a	1,398	17.10
Special	2,110	116	5.50
Commissary	841	48	5.71
Messman	1,564	362	23.15
Total	30,066	3,220	10.70

^aCoal passers totaled 2567, of whom 865 deserted for a rate of 33.67 percent, that is, one man in three. Firemen 2nd Class totaled 1577, of whom 301 deserted for a rate of 19.08 percent.

One final observation should be made about the high desertion rates in the engineer room ratings. The Secretary of the Navy noted high insanity rates among this group. His observations were confirmed by the reported sufferings of the so-called black gangs when at sea. For example, during the cruise of the Great White Fleet, one authority on that cruise noted that

Recruits assigned to the "black gangs" in the coal bunkers and furnace rooms began to wish they had never seen the "See the World" advertisements. Grimy from sweat and coal dust, they felt the heat grow with each day's run toward the tropics. . . . When coal-passer C. H. Montgomery grew ill, the Illinois took him to a hospital on the island of Culebra. Fireman Benjamin Northway died before the Missouri could deliver him to San Juan. The fleet stopped three minutes for the burial at sea of Robert Pipes, a Texan who had enlisted three months before. . . . Little could be done for the black gangs. At sea there were few opportunities to rest them and bring them up for fresh air. In port they suffered from the prestige aims of the cruise because their gray appearance, a combination of pallor and dirt against which scrubbing was not entirely effective, lost them their chance to be among the first-class men picked for shore leave. On the Virginia, during the first two months of the voyage, "every member of the engine room crew lost weight, became anemic, and showed a marked mental change . . . became suspicious and . . . two cases ended in insanity." In the entire fleet during the same brief period, 22 coal handlers went insane.

The data do not permit a conclusion of causality in the statistical sense, but it is impossible to escape the feeling that life in the black gang was intolerable. It is no surprise that desertion rates in this particular set of ratings were so high.

It is interesting to contrast Navy desertion rates with Army rates during the same period, although there is some danger in doing so because Army rates are based on the number of enlistment contracts for the calendar year, whereas the Navy rates are based on the enlisted

force at the end of the fiscal year. The effect is to make the Army rates lower because the divisor is higher. Nevertheless, it is not so much higher that the comparison is not interesting.

Table 7 shows that while the rate of desertion in the Army tended to fluctuate with changes in unemployment rates throughout the nation, the Navy rates tended to be more stable. One may speculate that this was caused by the sailor's sea duty. Once he decided to desert, he could only do so when his ship was in port.

By the 1920s, desertion rates were approximately the same for both services. It is an interesting hypothesis that by this time the services had taken steps to create fair and honorable conditions that would ensure them a minimum desertion rate. Enlistments were now based

Table 7
ARMY AND NAVY DESERTION RATES,
1900-1917
(In percent)

Year	Army	Navy	Unemployment
1900	4.0	14.5	5.0
1901	4.1	16.8	2.4
1902	5.0	14.1	2.7
1903	7.1	15.1	2.6
1904	6.6	15.3	4.8
1905	6.8	14.4	3.1
1906	7.4	15.1	0.8
1907	5.6	15.5	1.8
1908	4.6	15.5	8.5
1909	5.0	8.8	5.2
1910	3.7	7.9	5.2
1911	2.3	6.9	5.9
1912	3.0	6.4	5.2
1913	4.2	6.7	4.4
1914	3.1	5.2	8.0
1915	3.2	4.4	9.7
1916	3.1	3.8	4.8
1917	1.9	2.8	4.8

on the total makeup of society. Thus, desertion would depend on the percentage of men in the enlistment sample who simply could find no way to continue with a career that they had decided, for whatever reason, was unsuitable. Enlistment standards had eliminated many of the undesirables. Nevertheless, desertion did present problems.

The annual reports of the various service secretaries do not give desertion data after World War II because such data were now classified. When they do give data, it is the absent-without-official-leave (AWOL) rate. However, it is clear that this lost time concerned the secretaries and that they recognized that action was necessary to make military life more desirable or to stop enlisting those men most prone to go AWOL.

Some of the steps taken were general in nature and perhaps only indirectly pertained to the AWOL rates. For example,

the Enlisted Career Guidance Program neared completion. Eleven [new] career fields were introduced, 15 had staff coordination completed, and the remaining five were receiving staff coordination as of June 20. Publication of the career fields already introduced brought more than 60 percent of the Army's enlisted personnel under the Career Guidance Program.

Further,

Morale was conspicuously raised when on August 1, 1950, the "Dependent's Assistance Act of 1950" went into effect. This provides a liberal quarters allowance for enlisted personnel, payable to their dependents, supplemented by a prescribed allotment from the service member's pay. By June 30, 1951, the amount disbursed to Class "Q" allotment dependents by the Army Finance Center totalled \$420,664,362.50, of which \$265,038,688.45 was for Army dependents, and \$155,626,174.05 for Air Force dependents.

The Navy also had a "Q" allotment but the figures for moneys disbursed are not given.

Other steps taken were directly applicable to the AWOL rate. One of these was the publication of AR635-208, which made it easier to discharge enlisted men "who are determined to be unfit for further military service." There were several criteria for determining just what did and did not constitute unfitness:

- a. Frequent incidents of discreditable nature with civil or military authorities.
- b. Sexual perversion including but not limited to
 - (1) lewd and lascivious acts
 - (2) indecent exposure
 - (3) indecent acts with, or assault upon, a child
 - (4) other indecent acts or offenses.
- c. Drug addiction or the unauthorized use or possession of habit-forming narcotic drugs or marijuana.
- d. An established pattern for shirking.
- e. An established pattern showing dishonorable failure to pay just debts.

The Army stated quite clearly that "the main objective of these and related regulations is the efficient utilization of manpower."

A second regulation, AR635-209, had similar provisions but dealt with unsuitability. Here the major purpose was to allow commanders to discharge men who were clearly temperamentally unsuited for the tightly controlled discipline of a military unit.

Army AWOL rates did begin a downward trend and went from a high of approximately 140 per 1000 personnel in 1953 to about 40 per 1000 in

1960. Thereafter, with the Vietnam War, rates began to rise. Once again, in their official reports, the service secretaries did not report these rates because of their classification, but their concern was evident. The Army, for instance, commissioned a study to determine what factors influenced desertion rates and attempted to find the profile of the typical deserter. This was, of course, a tacit admission that during the Vietnam era desertion, despite legal definitions, was once again the fearsome detriment to efficient management of personnel. The study concluded that

The rate of desertion is likely to be higher for:

- o Nonhigh-school graduates than for graduates
- o Younger accessions than older ones
- o Accessions with lower mental ability than those with higher mental ability (as measured by the AFQT scores)
- o Enlistees than for inductees
- o Blacks than for Caucasians or others.

The findings were based on a population "comprised of 966,381 individuals who entered the Army during this time period, of whom 119,507 were New Mental Standards accessions."

The end of the Vietnam era saw an end to high desertion rates but not the elimination of desertion. Where there are armies, there will be desertions and, while the general level of desertion has decreased because potential deserters may be discharged more easily, it tends to vary with all of the factors discussed above.

VI. RECRUITMENT AND QUALITY OF PERSONNEL

We have in the service the scum
of the earth as common soldiers.

Wellington, letter to Earl
Bathurst, 2 July 1813

Commanders throughout our history have sought high-quality personnel, although the term quality has been hard to define. It has been easier, in fact, to say what it is not.

The quality of soldiers was poor at the outset of the Revolutionary War. The reasons were fairly clear. There were none of the devices available to us today for screening prospective recruits. When the recruiter was ordered to beat his drum, he made a clear decision. His answer to quality was simple. Anyone who volunteered and who could walk, talk, see, and hear (and not necessarily any two of these) was accepted. Age was not a factor, and there are documented accounts of young teenagers fighting in the Revolutionary Army.

Commanders knew they were not getting the best men in the Colonies. They attempted, therefore, to set standards. Early Army regulations give clues to some of these first attempts. In 1824 the regulations stated that "all free white male persons, above eighteen and under thirty-five years, being 5 feet 6 inches high, or above (for infantry), and 5 feet 8 inches high, or above (for artillery), who are able-bodied, active, and free from disease, may be enlisted." In 1847, during the Mexican War, the regulations stated that "all free white male persons,

above the age of 18, and under 35 years, being at least 5 feet 3 inches high, who are effective, able-bodied, sober, free from disease, and who have a competent knowledge of the English language, may be enlisted."

There were three determining factors in the selection process: First, racial restrictions prohibited blacks from enlisting; second, foreigners who could not speak English were not allowed to enlist; and third, height. The factor that varied was height.

Military history shows that tall men have been highly prized as soldiers. Frederick the Great selected only those recruits over 6 feet tall for his private guard, and Napoleon put his tallest men into his private guard. We may infer that height equated with prowess, loyalty, and intelligence. Note, therefore, that in 1824 the requirement for the artillery was for men 5 feet 8 inches tall, or higher, while the infantry took the smaller, or inferior, men. Later, when manpower problems became more acute because of the demands of the Mexican War, the height requirement was lowered to 5 feet 3 inches for all branches of the service.

It is well known that during the last century the average height of an individual in this country has been increasing because of continuing improvements in our diet and in our medical care. Thus, we may suppose that the average height during the 1800s was several inches shorter than it is today. Given the facts of average height, the Army changed the sample from which it allowed its recruiters to choose by simply increasing or decreasing height specifications. Because tall men equated with good soldiers, the requirements were more strict in 1824 than they were in 1847, a wartime period. In addition, the standards for artillery were more rigorous than those for the infantry. As we

shall see, the standards vary throughout history, depending on the demand and supply of manpower.

The quality problem was compounded, in part, by the belief that enlisted men were a commodity to be bought on the market and to be released when the need for them no longer existed. However, it became clear to those charged with national defense that quality could be improved by creating a body of regulars who would stay with the Army as a career, and thus steadily increase their skills with experience.

The first to propose such a cadre was Secretary of War Calhoun. That cadre was to be the basis for an expansible army that could be fleshed out in time of war to meet a threat and could contract in time of peace (to prepare for the next expansion).

Congress did not agree to the expansible army but recognized the necessity to keep the existing army at strength. Until Calhoun became Secretary of War, the traditional method of providing replacements to make up for the formidable losses arising from desertion and the other causes, such as death and disabling illnesses, had been the regimental recruiting system. This system, however, had proved almost valueless in keeping the Regular Army at strength.

The shortage of men became so serious that a new solution was tried in July 1822 when the Army opened recruiting offices in New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. The men recruited by these stations were enlisted without consideration of need or coordination with regiments. In other words, this was the beginning of the centralized recruiting system such as exists today. The results were phenomenal by the standards of that day. Within six months the new stations had recruited 641 men, who were then distributed to the regiments according to need.

The experiment was so successful that additional stations were opened in Boston, Providence, and Albany. The total of all stations recruited 1980 men during 1823, as compared with 823 recruited by the regiments. This success of generalized recruiting stations led to an extension of the system to the West in 1824 with the creation of units in Louisville, Natchez, and Cincinnati.

The general recruiting stations were immediately recognized as an important military activity, and regulations governing their operation were published. By 1825 these new stations, and the recruiting concept embodied in them, had become fixtures in the Army. They were able to supply regiments with recruits that the regiments were unable to find, probably because the sphere of activity of the regiments was limited to the area in which they found themselves and therefore to a limited sample from which to draw recruits. This was particularly true of the Western district and "the principal purpose of the General Recruiting Service was to supply recruits for the frontier posts. Units serving near centers of population were expected to employ regimental recruiting parties to obtain the men they needed."

Despite its success, the new recruiting system did not come to grips with the problem of producing quality soldiers. For example, recruits were supposed to receive some training before they were sent to their regiments. No doubt they did, but as in the case of Fort Atkinson described below many did not.

One might naively suppose that the chief business of soldiers at Fort Atkinson (about 15 miles north of Omaha, Nebraska) was the protection of the frontier. Be that as it may, a garrison order reported that two soldiers were robbed of their ammunition by the

Indians. The order commented upon this shameful and disgraceful indignity and specified that soldiers who loaned or sold their arms or allowed them to be taken would thereafter be compelled to go out of the fort unarmed. The inspectors noted that "the chief business of the soldiers . . . was farming" and "garrison orders show that drilling was compulsory unless other duties interfered." However, the farming was so important that "in one year there was no drilling whatever from September to December. Farming came first. In fact, it became so extensive and so absorbing that the military duties became distinctly secondary."

Training was not the only quality deficiency. The medical inspections by the recruiter and his surgeon were in some cases totally incompetent, even bordering on atrocity. Recruit Robert Miller was rejected for disability after he arrived at the principal depot on Bedloe's Island, New York, because "of being branded 'Deserter' on his right thigh." Recruit William Bryan was rejected "on account of deep syphilitic scars upon the left arm, preceded by exfoliations of bone, also scars of the same nature, about the parts of generation causing a degree of lameness, also an enlargement of the spermatic chord on the right side." Order No. 18 continues by noting that "The Board express the opinion, that [Bryan is] not qualified to perform the duties of soldiers . . . [and that his disabilities] are of such a nature as might have been readily discovered by due care and attention on the part of the examining surgeon and recruiting officer."

General quality standards for the men were so low that they finally attracted Congressional attention. One proposal, made by Mr. Ward, a New York Congressman, was to enlist boys between the ages of 16 and 17,

with the consent of their parents, and require them to attend special schools of instruction. They would then be taken into the Army. Gradually, the sponsors believed, the influx of these boys from better families would decrease the number of foreigners in the enlisted ranks and would ensure that the native Americans entering the force were of high quality and well trained to assume the duties of noncommissioned officers.

The Army itself felt that the plan was too restrictive and notified Congress that "boys of the age of 16 or 17, who would probably be permitted to enlist, are likely to have too many fixed habits, that might interfere with their docility and improvement; and [the Commanding General of the Army] proposes the age of 12 or 13, and to extend the term of enlistment of twelve years, or to the age of twenty-five." Further training of this group would be ensured. "The juvenile corps is to be collected at some suitable army post, where a school is to be established, to instruct the members of it in all the branches adapted to their age and the purpose of their enlistment." The boys would then be rotated through various assignments in the grade of corporal and sergeant. "At the end of eight years, these corporals are to receive (always, provided, they merit the promotion) the rank and pay of sergeants, according to such rules as the President should establish." The preliminary training and testing of these young men would have immediate benefits. "It is further proposed that these companies, thus organized and instructed, shall replace those now in existence, in due course of time remodeling the whole rank and file of the army."

The Army plan was not received favorably by Congress and was

dropped. A similar plan for the Navy, as we shall see later, was more favorably received.

The importance of good noncommissioned officers was well recognized, as well as the necessity for training them. A proposal was made to establish a school for such training. Although the proposal shows the prejudices of the times, it also probably accurately reflects the shortcomings in the enlisted ranks. It stated that the transition from

the highly cultivated mind of the officer, to the illiterate and ignoble state of the common soldier, is too great; and the inferiority of the latter is so apparent, as frequently to disgust the officer with his proper company duties. This disparity ought to be remedied . . . by assimilating this intermediate class in question [the noncommissioned officer] more toward the officer than the soldier, instead of being allied, as they long have been, to the latter by kindred vices. They would then become powerful and efficient aids to their superiors; duty would be more cheerfully performed; resignations and desertions would be less frequent; the regulations, by being better understood, would be better enforced; and discipline, throughout the whole of the line of the army, would become much more rigid and perfect; and in this way alone can we expect to improve the condition of the soldier.

Congress did nothing, and the proposal was abandoned.

In the early days of its existence, the Navy, like the Army, made no attempt to create a career force of enlisted men. Instead, each captain was responsible for the recruitment of his own crew. These crewmen came from the waterfronts of the country, consisted in large part of "foreigners," and were a rough breed. Drunkenness and brawling, by all accounts, were common, and the men lived in sailors' "homes" between cruises. These homes were more often than not brothels and those that were not were little better in cleanliness and other amenities.

Left to its own devices, the Navy would no doubt have ultimately realized that changes were necessary. However, the first lead in caring for the morals of the seamen came from groups of concerned citizens. This represented an indirect thrust at improving the quality of Navy personnel. Granted, some of the leaders in the citizen movement were former naval officers who had either resigned or retired from the service and had decided to devote themselves to the causes of religion and the moral uplifting of the sailor.

The problems of recruiting for the Navy were perhaps best summed up by the following excerpt from a letter signed "DALE":

It is a melancholy truth, which can be substantiated by many respectable officers, that at this time a very great proportion of the seamen employed in our Navy are foreigners; and a large majority of our petty officers is composed of the same material. . . . The great portion of those [officers] with whom he [the author] has conversed on this subject, acknowledge that from two-thirds to three-fourths of the [men] are foreigners, and at least nine-tenths of the petty officers. This evil pervades also the merchant service, and is increasing.

It is small wonder that recruiters had difficulty finding quality men. Conditions on board the receiving ships were unbelievably harsh to the point of being, by even the laxest standards, criminally negligent.

One writer, who spent six years in a naval man-of-war, gave a vivid description of conditions facing new recruits on board the ship Alert about 1812. He began by noting that "as a general thing, order and discipline are seldom found to prevail to any extent on board of a receiving ship. . . . At the time I was on board the Alert she was commanded by a drunken tyrannical master's mate." Events from there on in went downhill:

I hardly stepped from the ladder, when close by me, this master's mate knocked a man down for not touching his hat as he passed him. Everything was in the utmost disorder; men were drunk and roaring about the deck, and away forward, in a hole which they called a sick bay, were some ten or a dozen miserable creatures. One was raving in a paroxysm of delirium tremens; there were ten in the last stages of consumption, and could not live many hours, and several with fever and diarrhoea. And such a smell!

Little was done to provide the recruits with even the simplest necessities. For example,

The weather was very cold and stormy, and many of these poor fellows had sold every article of clothing except what they stood in, for rum. Hence they were unprotected from the weather. . . . [Though the government had furnished them with hammocks], many of them kept themselves too drunk to hang them up, and would lie down and sleep on the wet deck. . . . One morning a dead man was found on the berth deck. . . . The poor fellow had died during the night, probably from exposure, as he possessed neither bed nor clothing. . . . There was no one on whom the duty of taking proper care of the corpse devolved, so it lay there all that day, frozen stiff.

In due course, the entire matter of quality and morality came to the attention of the Secretary of the Navy and to Congress. On 15 December 1835, the Secretary wrote Congress that

the importance of rearing a body of seamen, by enlisting into the service of our navy boys over the age of thirteen and under the age of eighteen, until they should arrive at the age of twenty-one years, has already attracted the attention of Congress. At the last session a bill for this purpose was introduced into the Senate. Every year the importance of this measure becomes more apparent. Able seamen are much wanted, while there are boys enough in our cities, leading lives of idleness and vice for want of employment, who, if thus enlisted, under judicious regulations, would in a few years afford us a sufficient corps of able seamen to man our navy, and in the meantime render services to their country worth their pay.

This was merely the reiteration of a plan that had been proposed in 1825

by then Secretary of the Navy Samuel L. Southard, but which Congress did not accept. Significantly, in 1838 Southard was the chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs.

The plan was nothing more nor less than the apprentice system that, as noted earlier, the Army had also sought. The Navy was more fortunate and was able to persuade Congress that such a system should be instituted. In the language of the day, the Act of 2 March 1837 was "agreeable" to this principle and stated that "it shall be lawful to enlist (a) boys for the navy, with the consent of their parents or guardians, not being under thirteen nor over eighteen years of age, to serve until they shall arrive at the age of twenty-one years."

For a combination of reasons, the apprentice program never did achieve its objectives. The wording of the Act of 2 March 1837 was fairly simple, probably to ease its passage, but never spelled out in any detail what an apprentice could expect once he enlisted. As a consequence, many of the boys (and their parents) expected that apprentices would be attending something akin to a military academy and, in due course, would receive a commission. Such, of course, was not the case. The purpose of the Act was to build a career enlisted force, not to augment the officer corps. This misunderstanding created discontent and led to demands for, and the granting of, many discharges. When these were not forthcoming, desertions resulted. Some alleged that the system failed because many of the boys were recruited from the large cities and that only a few of them were able to elevate themselves above their previous miserable status. Many were said to be of foreign parentage or of foreign birth--the very background the Act was trying to avoid.

Although the apprentice program died in 1845, various efforts were made after that date to revive it. As of 1855, it operated with some success until the Civil War. Whatever its faults, the apprentice idea was the beginning of efforts to create a career force for the Navy.

The quality issue (as well as quantity) was lent support by the creation of the national draft during the Civil War. It started in the South when the Confederate government bypassed the states to obtain the manpower it needed to support the armies now spread from the Atlantic to the Mississippi and from the Mason-Dixon line to the Gulf of Mexico. The North followed in quick order with its own version of the draft. The language of the Act of 17 April 1862 gave President Lincoln leeway to establish the necessary rules and regulations for those states that did not have adequate laws to govern the militia levied upon them by the Federal Government. The President used this law to proclaim that any state that had not met its quota of volunteers by 15 August 1862 would be subject to the draft. With this broad interpretation of the language of the Act, the draft was born as a federal institution and was formalized by the Enrollment Act of 3 March 1863. The draft came at a time when casualty lists had grown so large that enlistments could not replace the attrition that was slowly reducing the Army to impotence.

When the war was over, the Army was drastically reduced in size and was dispersed over the frontier in company-size units. Military life was difficult, and recruits were hard to find. Those who did enlist were shipped to their post without training or, at best, with minimal training that did not prepare them for the constant fighting with the Indian tribes.

Efforts to improve training were spurred by local commanders who wanted men on whom they could rely. Such a need had been perceived as early as 1873 when the Inspector General called attention to the fact that recruits in depots were receiving no training because the demands of the frontier posts for personnel forced the transfer of recruits almost as rapidly as they could be found. He suggested that it would be in the best interest of the recruits and of the service to train them for several weeks in the depots.

Methods to implement training began in earnest in 1882 when the Adjutant General, Brigadier General B. C. Drum, suggested that recruits be trained for a period of four months at two depots, David's Island and Jefferson Barracks. During this period, not only would the recruit be transformed into a trained soldier before reporting to his new unit, but also the incompetent could be weeded out. Many of these were able to pass the physical examination but might not possess the intelligence or the moral standards desired. The government thus saved the cost of transporting the recruits to distant Western posts, where they invariably deserted or their performance was found unsatisfactory.

These efforts at improved quality control and training coincided with the first attempts to classify soldiers according to military skills, or what is now called the Military Occupational Skills (MOS) program. First came the repeal of a law that required that company privates be detailed, in turn, to be cook for a period of ten days. This haphazard system had been the cause of digestive disorders among the men for many years. The new law took effect on 29 January 1879 and gave the company commander more latitude in the choice of cooks. In 1884 the Inspector General recommended that each company enlist two

professional cooks and that each post have a professional baker on duty, and three years later he suggested that one man per company be enlisted with the sole duty of cooking. Finally, in 1899, Congress authorized two enlisted cooks with sergeant's pay for each company or battery. It was the duty of the recruiter to determine a man's qualifications as cook.

Education was recognized as a factor in producing higher quality soldiers. When the Regular Army was reorganized in 1866 by an act of Congress, each permanent post or station was required to establish a school for the education of enlisted personnel. Unfortunately, the legislation did not specify the details of how the education was to be given or the facilities that were to be provided. The Army and Navy Register of 14 February 1880 listed all the schools in the Army as of December 1879 and revealed that of 111 schools at various posts a total of 42 had no building, no teacher, or were otherwise not operating. Nonetheless, 866 enlisted men and 1267 children had attended the schools in December. The revised regulations of 1881 specified details, and officers were directed to encourage school attendance. The basic curriculum for enlisted personnel was composed of the three Rs--reading, writing, arithmetic--and some history and geography.

The 1866 Act prescribed that the regimental chaplain be responsible for the education of black soldiers. As in the case of the white units, there was a dearth of facilities. In some instances, white officers were reluctant to act as teachers, and there were few qualified black enlisted men who could assume the responsibilities of teaching a class. The 25th Infantry could boast of a good record:

Attendance during the first four years averaged daily over 100 men. When the post school was closed by severe storm damage, the men kept their books and studied nightly in the barracks. In 1878, Chaplain Mullins reported that in the preceding three years more than 160 of his men had learned to read and write, and twenty-four of them had been given assignments as regimental clerks. He maintained that the men who had learned to read and write soon developed "a sense of self-respect and pride of soldiership."

The flaw in the program, from the standpoint of the black soldier, was the segregation of facilities. The Regulations of 1881 read: "If the command consists of white and colored troops, it necessitates two schools or two separate rooms . . . equally well fitted up and as comfortable as the room used for the white soldier."

The possible forerunner of today's noncommissioned officer schools was established in the 1880s when specialized instruction was offered to men seeking advancement. Selected privates and noncommissioned officers were given various types of instruction, including tactics.

Efforts were also made to improve life in the Navy and, thereby, attract a better quality sailor. It was obvious to Congress and to the Navy that life aboard ship was not popular, and in an effort to correct the situation, the apprentice system was reinstituted in 1875 to provide for career-oriented seamen. By 1893, however, only 10 percent of the apprentices stayed on in the Navy at the completion of their tour. Disillusionment with the service, a mistaken belief that apprenticeship would lead to an appointment to Annapolis, and the harsh treatment of men by their officers all contributed.

The quality of sailors was also affected by the enlistment of large numbers of foreigners. One officer labeled the enlisted force as "the dregs of all countries." Another officer remarked in 1873 that

"frequently on the return of a United States vessel from a cruise, about the only [U.S.] nationality she has is in her officers and the flag flying at her peak." That this evaluation was not wide of its mark is shown by the sinking of the Ashuelot in the China Sea in 1883 and the revelation that only 19 of her 111-man crew were native-born Americans.

In 1904 the Army reinstituted the system of recruiting depots, which had been abolished in 1894, in an attempt to meet the complaints of the unit commanders about the men they were receiving. The recruits were kept at the depots to determine their physical fitness for service, but the only training they received was incidental. This was an obviously inefficient use of the depot and, by 1905, permanent parties were assigned to weed out the unfit and to instruct others. In 1906, courses of instruction were ordered, and recruits attended daily lectures and practical demonstrations on military subjects. By 1910, a 36-day course of instruction was in effect and received an enthusiastic endorsement by the Commanding General of the Department of the Lakes:

The training of recruits before assigning them to their permanent organizations in the Army has proved not only a success, but one of very great value to the Army. The recruit now joins his company, troop, or battery feeling that he is a soldier and is able to take part in drills and the exercises of his organization without difficulty. . . . Certainly the idea of training recruits at the recruiting rendezvous before assigning them to their permanent organizations was a most beneficial one.

This schedule of instruction was, of course, the predecessor of today's basic and advanced individual training programs.

The value of recruit training at depots was further emphasized by a maneuver with understrength units held in 1911. All of the recruits who had joined the Army during the period of the maneuver were assigned to

the participating units. Two difficulties were immediately apparent. First, the units were not brought to strength; second, the efficiency of the units decreased because there was no way to train the recruits under the simulated battle conditions. A unit could not simultaneously fight a war and train recruits. The Army needed an enlisted reserve to make up for the early combat losses but could not, under existing policies, replace them. The General Staff gave its view in a succinct statement: "It is the experience of modern warfare that any given unit loses at least 50 percent of its strength in the first 6 months of war. If this loss is not replaced, there is a 50 percent deterioration in the power of the unit; and if it is replaced by raw men, the quality of the force as a highly trained team is destroyed."

When the nation entered World War I, the administration took heed of the experiences of our allies and immediately proposed a draft. High casualty rates had a strong, depressive effect on voluntary enlistments. President Wilson's endorsement of the Selective Service Act of 18 May 1917 contained an inherent recognition of the need to use and to manage all the manpower resources of the nation wisely:

Our objective is a mobilization of all the productive and active forces of the nation, and their development to the highest point of cooperation and efficiency, and the idea of the selective draft is that those should be chosen for service in the Army who can most readily be spared from the prosecution of the other activities which the country must engage in, and to which it must devote a great deal of its best energy and capacity. The volunteer system does not do this. When men choose for themselves, they sometimes choose without due regard to their other responsibilities.

The large number of men and the new demands of war also required the proper classification of men so that they could be used in the most efficient manner. This was a quality problem. The Regular Army did not

have a classification system, and it had no one with the necessary expertise to establish one. Fortunately, the civilian sector, by now, had personnel experts who could be called on for assistance.

The Secretary of War formed the Committee on Classification of Personnel in the Army within the Office of the Adjutant General on 5 August 1917. From the start, the Committee operated from a set of personnel principles that had begun to take shape in the new but expanding field of personnel management which some of the larger corporations had begun to adopt for themselves as a way of ensuring the efficient use of personnel and of cutting the cost associated with high turnover rates.

The Committee recommended that six basic principles be applied. The first was the principle of functionalization: All personnel work had to be centralized in one office that had "responsibility in the search for talent, in personnel classification, in assigning men to the duties where their special abilities [would] count for most." In the early days of the war, however, the Army did not apply this principle. As a consequence, the company commander was initially ordered to prepare the soldier's qualification card and, according to one writer, "the results were sometimes disconcerting":

The information on the cards was occasionally inadequate or misleading, due to lack of skill in eliciting full and exact information from the soldier, and all too frequent instances came to light where the company commander had deliberately hidden the good men by reporting them as laborers or farm hands instead of engineers, accountants, and telegraphers which they were, thus reducing the likelihood of losing them by transfer to other companies.

Ultimately, the preparation of the qualification was made the responsibility of a board of specially trained interviewers. Finally, a

Personnel Branch was created in the General Staff, and the personnel function was thereafter centralized in one staff office.

The second principle was that of human differences, by which the board understood that "however profoundly one may be committed to the social theory of Rousseau and Jefferson that all men are created equal,, every employer and every officer in command of troops knows that there are enormous inequalities of skill and talent." It was the board's purpose "to refine the available information about officers and men, to make it a more reliable statement of qualifications, and so to diminish in a measure the tremendous waste of precious human material through misplacement."

The third principle was that of specific personnel requirements: "Successful personnel administration calls for definiteness in the description of duties and in the statements of qualifications sought in the men who are to discharge those duties." The board found that

ambiguities of terminology led new civilian officers astray; as when they assumed that the army term "Wagoner," which appeared frequently in the Tables of Organization, always meant a man capable of making wagon repairs. In some units those were the requirements, while elsewhere the term was used to mean merely "wagon driver," and even "truck driver." . . . In some outfits, the duties of the "Master Signal Electrician" required him to be an experienced telephone lineman, while in others he need know no electricity but must be a tailor or an experienced pigeonier. . . . An explicit statement of duties was indispensable before a wise selection could be made of the men to be trained for those posts.

The fourth principle was that of organization, which the board understood as follows: "To effect a speedy adjustment between the personnel requirement and the available supply, a suitable organization is essential."

The fifth principle was that of economy of personnel. According to the board, "After the personnel executive has assured himself that he has a man who can fully qualify for the post the question arises, 'Would this man be still more useful somewhere else?'" In other words, the first step toward the economic use of the personnel resource requires a decision as to a given man's greatest value to the Army. This in turn meant that a scale of military values was needed to establish a hierarchy among the various skills needed by the Army.

Finally, the board recognized the importance of the principle of morale, by which it meant that "any shifts of personnel, including assignments, transfers, promotions and demotions, should always be made with due consideration for their effect on the spirit of the men and the organizations concerned."

Armed with these six principles, the Committee began at once to develop classification methods for enlisted men. Before the war ended, it had done pioneering work into psychiatric testing to facilitate classification and had devised tests for 83 of the more essential trades. It also drew up tables of occupational needs for various military units and published the trade specification and occupational indices as well as qualification cards and a rating scale adaptable to military units. It also contacted employers to assist in identifying various specialists who had entered the Army.

The Navy also had quality problems. During the Spanish-American War, it had experienced great difficulties in enlisting trained sailors, and with the end of the war came a change in its recruiting policy. The new program initiated in 1899 was designed to enlist "landsmen for training," who were to be young men with no previous experience at sea.

The decision to enlist landsmen removed the necessity to restrict recruiting to the Eastern ports. Recruiting parties began to move inland, and by 1907 stations had been established in Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, and the Mississippi Valley. During that year, there were 15,500 first enlistments, and of that total 73 percent came from the interior and only 23 percent from coastal cities, in sharp contrast with previous periods when only seven coastal cities had supplied 77 percent of the first enlistments. By the middle of 1919, this expanded effort resulted in 49 main recruiting stations and 267 substations scattered over the nation.

Centralization of the recruiting function also changed the previous policy of permitting individual captains to recruit their own crews. The demands of the service for more and more men during World War I strained the resources of the recruiting stations and captains were permitted for a time to continue shipboard enlistments. In addition, to make recruiting easier, men were permitted to remain on board the ship that had enlisted them. However, by 1925 enlistments on shipboard were discontinued, and Naval regulations stated that "first enlistments are authorized to be made only at regular recruiting stations and at naval training stations."

The new enlisted force transformed the common perception of sailors as brawlers, drinkers, and womanizers. The new recruits resented civilians who tended to look down on sailors as people but who welcomed the fleet for its economic benefits to the community. In this climate of discrimination, sailors turned to the courts. In one of the first legal actions, Fred J. Buenzle lodged a suit in 1906 against the Newport Amusement Company. Buenzle, a chief yeoman at the Newport Naval

Training Station and editor of Bluejacket, had purchased a ticket to a dance while he was dressed in civilian clothes. Changing into his uniform, he returned to the hall and was denied admission. Buenzle refused to accept a refund and sued the company. He was unable to collect damages beyond the price of the ticket, although he appealed his case to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the suit attracted national attention when President Theodore Roosevelt contributed \$100 in support of Buenzle. The publicity no doubt encouraged the passage of a 1908 act in Rhode Island prohibiting discrimination against men in uniform.

The major technological changes, particularly in aviation, that were introduced into the armed forces during World War I created new recruitment and quality problems. Skilled specialists were needed to repair airplanes, repair radios, keep trucks rolling, intercept messages, assist surgeons in intricate operations, and on and on.

Important provisions were made in the Act of 1916 for the enlisted grade structure. Enlisted men were placed in seven grades with pay ranging from \$74 for the first grade to \$30 for the seventh grade. For each five years of service, an enlisted man was to receive a differential of 10 percent but not more than 40 percent of the base pay. In addition, recognition was given to the need for specialists (which had been demonstrated by the experience of our allies in World War I). Enlisted men in the sixth and seventh grades could qualify in any one of six different classes of specialists and receive additional pay of from \$25 for specialist first class to \$3 for specialist sixth class.

A new specialist system was announced to the Army in General Order 36 of 19 June 1920. Subsequent details (with the designation of those

AD-A118 149

RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA

THE EVOLUTION OF ARMED FORCES ENLISTED PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT POL--ETC(U)

JUL 82 J H HAYES

F49620-82-C-0018

UNCLASSIFIED

RAND/N-1893-AF

NL

2 OF 2

AD A
118149

END

DATE

FILED

09-82

DTIC

duties deemed to require specialists) were published in Army Regulations. By 13 December 1923, Army Regulation 615-10 (AR615-10) listed 227 different positions requiring specialists. Most of these had at least three classes of specialists (fourth, fifth, and sixth), and many had six classes. In all, AR615-10 had 802 variations of the 227 different trades designated as needing specialists. Further compounding this complexity was the fact that a specialist could be either a private or a private first class. Thus, there was a theoretical total of 1602 different paychecks based on the grade of a soldier and then his class as a specialist. And this was before the advent of the computer. It is small wonder that, at the beginning of World War II, the specialist system was replaced with only three technician grades.

However, the technician grades generated their own problems. The specialist was a private or private first class; the technician was a noncommissioned officer. Thus, technicians were required to perform command duties such as sergeant-of-the-guard or corporal-of-the-guard details. Many of them were unable to exercise such command authority and, moreover, did not wish to do so. Such duties interfered with the efficient performance of what technicians conceived to be their main task, such as cooking, automotive maintenance, aircraft maintenance, etc. As a result, further changes were made in the designation of technicians' responsibilities, but not in their function as highly skilled personnel in some narrowly defined field. Finally, in 1954, the grade of technician was abolished, and the concept of specialist was restored (with different insignia). The Army's position was clearly stated:

These regulations set forth procedures designed to increase the prestige of the noncommissioned officer in the Army by identifying him as an enlisted commander of troops. In order to do so, it is necessary to distinguish the noncommissioned officer from the enlisted technician or administrative specialist. These regulations affect the necessary distinction, and at the same time give full recognition to the importance of the noncommissioned officer and the specialist. While it is the desire of the Department of the Army to restore the noncommissioned officer to his traditional position as the backbone of the Army, it is also of fundamental importance that prestige and respect properly due to the specialist be preserved.

The new grade structure did away with such titles as technical sergeant, staff sergeant, or technician and replaced them with the titles listed in Table 8. With the exception of the supergrades, E-8 and E-9, which were added in June 1958, this is the grade structure that exists today.

The need for and supply of specialists were complicated by the long time period required to train some of the higher skills. In some cases college training was needed. This meshed very neatly with the supply/quality dilemma. For example, young men were sent to

Table 8
ENLISTED GRADE STRUCTURE, 1954

Grade	Noncommissioned Officer	Specialist	Private
E-7	Master Sergeant	Master Specialist	
E-6	Sergeant 1st Class	Specialist 1st Class	
E-5	Sergeant	Specialist 2nd Class	
E-4	Corporal	Specialist 3rd Class	
E-3			Private 1st Class
E-2			Private E-2
E-1			Private E-1

colleges during World War I, but because the need for specialists was only beginning to be understood, the training of these men was often wasted.

During World War II, 18-year-olds who could not be procured without deferment could be enrolled in the Army Specialist Training Program (ASTP):

To avoid the shortcomings of the Student Army Training Corps of World War I, the plan for ASTP was tied firmly to the military program of the Army. Selected enlisted men were to be assigned to various colleges and universities for academic instruction, but only after they had received basic military training, which was to be continued under a cadet organization while they were in college. Under the plan proposed, the Army would be assured of receiving from each oncoming age group a due proportion of men with advanced training, shaped with reference to ultimate military requirements.

Of the 46,188 men assigned to ASTP during 1943, 45,114 or 97.7 percent were mental category I or II.

The quality of enlisted personnel forced hard choices on the decisionmakers. For instance, when the Air Force needed men in World War II, it found that the available pool was lacking in the requisite skills. Table 9 shows that most of the technical skills needed by the Air Force in large numbers would have to be provided by training after an individual was enlisted or inducted. The problem was made even more severe, however, when it was discovered in December 1941 (the first month of the war for America) that 46 percent of the men inducted were unqualified by reason of AGCT,* or otherwise, for technical training. In this climate of scarcity, the Air Corps argued that its needs for technical personnel were greater than other parts of the Army and

* Army General Classification Test.

Table 9

CIVILIAN SKILLS VERSUS AIR FORCE REQUIREMENTS
(Per 1000 persons)

Skill	Air Force Requirements	Civilian Occurrence
Radio	127.3	3.3
Armorer	49.1	29.9
Airplane mechanic	258.2	42.2
Clerk	211.3	121.7
Total	645.9	197.1

requested, in January 1942, that 75 percent of its enlisted allocation have AGCT scores of 100 or better. The War Department approved the request in February 1942 but, unfortunately, failed to foresee the full consequences of the policy.

The preferential policy had two bad results. First, the rest of the services were deprived of their fair share of the personnel with average or higher than average AGCT scores. Second, the Air Force was deprived of urgently needed men who already possessed the specialties from their civilian employment and who would have made the training problem easier.

As a result, the preferential policy was rescinded on 18 July 1942. The real problem was, however, the national manpower pool: only 55 percent of the national average of men scored above 100 on the AGCT test. This situation lasted until almost the last days of the war even though various other policies ranging from lowering standards, creating aptitude tests, special recruiting appeals, and so forth were tried.

The problem of the national manpower pool should not have been a surprise. Inherent in the definition of "average" is the concept that

approximately half of the entities involved are above it and half are below it. Therefore, if an AGCT score of 100 was the "average trainability" criterion, then about half of the men who registered should have scores above 100 and half should have scores below 100. The only requirement was that the test be properly constructed to reflect the average. In this case, it apparently was.

The ASTP program was also affected by the preferential policy. In fact, the program was drastically cut because of combat losses (in the winter of 1943-1944), which were so severe that every available source of manpower was required to keep the combat forces effective. Almost overnight large numbers of ASTP trainees became infantry privates. The fact was that a crisis had been developing for two years in the ground arms. Quantitatively, the provision for combat troops in the Troops Basis (the listing of units in the force), especially for infantrymen, left no margin of safety. Qualitatively, the ground combat arms had been persistently denied a proportionate share of high-intelligence personnel. The men lost in combat at the end of 1943, many of whom were noncommissioned and commissioned officers in the junior grades (squad and platoon leaders), made it mandatory that higher quality personnel capable of quickly stepping into these leadership billets be increased in number.

World War II also saw the creation of organizations composed solely of women. These units were adopted as an indirect method of increasing the number of male personnel in combat arms duties. The Women's Army Corps was created with the avowed purpose of placing 100,000 women into the Troops Basis as a means of replacing men in desk jobs as well as other service duties and freeing those men for service in the combat

arms. Many of the men who were engaged in service-type activities and in administration were also in the higher AGCT categories and would increase the quality of combat arms personnel.

Similar units were created in the Navy and Marines. Perhaps the most ambitious program was the Air Force WASP program. Women were actually trained to fly planes and successfully flew ferry missions, towed target sleeves for antiaircraft practices, and flew as couriers. All in all, almost 2000 women pilots were trained for these missions.

World War II did prove to the services that it was harder to train lower quality personnel, and that, as a general rule, such personnel created more disciplinary problems. The Korean experience, with partial remobilization, underscored this point. As a result, several steps were taken to improve the quality of enlisted personnel. Two of these (AR635-208 and AR635-209), mentioned earlier, recommended the early discharge of men deemed unfit for service life.

Both of these regulations are being attacked today in various court cases concerning the rights of homosexuals to serve in the armed forces, as well as by legislation designed to legalize marijuana. At this writing, there is no way to predict how such litigation will turn out, although there are indications that the pendulum swing started in the era of the 60s has begun its backward swing. Whatever the result, issues of quality personnel will constantly confront commanders, and the services will be in search of methods to improve that quality by whatever measures the public will accept.

VII. THE USE OF BLACK MANPOWER

. . . all men are created equal . . .

Declaration of Independence

All animals are equal, but some
animals are more equal than others.

"The Animal Farm," George Orwell

Racial concerns within the armed forces are not a phenomenon peculiar to the 1960s and 1970s. When the Revolutionary Army assembled before Boston, it quickly became apparent that the presence of slaves and free blacks raised philosophical and emotional racial issues. Blacks had offered their services and had been recruited in many units even though they had been left out of the militia organizations formed in 1774-75.

Asked to comment on the enlistment of blacks, the Committee of Safety stated "that the admission of any person, as soldiers, into the Army now raising, but only such as are freemen, will be inconsistent with the principles that are to be supported, and reflect dishonour on this colony; and that no slaves be admitted into this Army upon any consideration whatsoever." The Committee's opinion is reasonable only in the context of the times, but has the merit that the issue was faced head on; the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts was less forthright and tabled the matter. As a result of this ambiguity, free blacks were everywhere in evidence. Colonel Prescott noted that at Bunker Hill a

black named Salem Poor "behaved like an experienced officer as well as an excellent soldier."

The British, eager to use every resource to quell the rebellion, issued a proclamation in November 1775 that freed all indented servants and slaves if they were able and willing to join the British army. The proclamation in turn precipitated Washington's general order of 30 December 1775 that allowed recruiting officers to enlist free blacks. Washington also brought the matter before Congress, where a decision was finally made to permit those blacks who had served faithfully at Cambridge to reenlist in the new army being created for 1776 (all commitments to the original army having terminated in December 1775).

Blacks continued in the Army in large numbers despite these legislative efforts designed to minimize their number. Indeed, on 24 August 1778, the strength returns showed that seven brigades of Washington's Army had an average of 54 blacks in each one. Even the enemy noted their presence. A Hessian officer in 1777 said that "one sees no regiment in which there are not Negroes in abundance, and among them are able-bodied, sturdy fellows."

The states themselves conspired to contravene the Congressional prohibition to enlist slaves. To solve their own persistent difficulties in supplying men to the Army, one of the common subterfuges was that used by Rhode Island: Slaves were purchased by the state and then freed to join a regiment.

The situation was different in the South, where states refused permission to their commanders to enlist blacks even though Congress had ultimately approved the idea. This policy was not without opposition, and one commander maintained "that five thousand black soldiers might change the course of the next campaign."

The problem in the South was not the slaves themselves but the institution of slavery. The loss of slave labor would have played havoc with the economy. According to one Southerner,

If they [the enemy] once see us disposed to arm the blacks . . . they will follow the example and not disdain to fight us in our own way, and this would bring on the southern states inevitable ruin. At least it would draw off immediately such a number of the best labourers for the culture of the earth as to ruin individuals, distress the state, and perhaps the Continent, when all that can be raised by their assistance is but barely sufficient to keep us jogging along with the great expense of the war.

The British did not forget the black in the War of 1812. They employed much the same strategy as during the Revolution, except that their plans were more explicit. They used one pretext or another in their attempt to recruit blacks. Admiral Cochrane, the British Commander, wrote that he hoped to overcome a shortage of troops by encouraging "the disaffection of the colored population" and that Tangier Island in the Chesapeake Bay would be seized with this end in view: "When fortified it will be a place of refuge for the blacks to fly to." On 1 July 1814 he wrote that "the great point to be attained is the cordial support of the black population. With them properly armed and backed with 20,000 British troops, Mr. Madison will be hurled from his throne." Cochrane's plans were too grandiose. The blacks wanted true freedom, not nominal freedom, and "after three months of the most energetic efforts . . . only 120 black recruits" had joined the British colors.

The first overt act of hostility in the War of 1812 resulted when three American blacks--Ware, Martin, and Strachon--were impressed from

an American frigate Chesapeake by the British frigate Leopold. In what appears now to be an unbelievable error of judgment on the part of the British captain, he claimed that the three blacks were British subjects and demanded their surrender. When his demand was refused, he opened fire upon the Chesapeake, killing three and wounding eighteen of the crew.

As in the Army, the blacks also enlisted in the Navy from the first days of the Revolution, although "Commodore Preble gave explicit instructions not to enlist Negroes. . . . This had no lasting effect on their entrance into the service." They were used mostly as cooks. There is no record of segregation, and, given the crowded conditions on board the vessels of the era, segregation would have been unrealistic.

At the Battle of New Orleans, the last in the War of 1812, blacks comprised approximately 9 percent of Jackson's army and at the Battle of Lake Erie approximately 25 percent of Commodore Perry's fleet.

Racial quotas, a subject of concern today in the effort to ensure equality, were a matter of official note at the end of the Colonial period. The recruiting regulations of 1839 stated that "free blacks and other colored persons" could enlist with the consent of the commander of a naval station. On 13 September 1839 the Acting Secretary of the Navy issued what amounted to a restriction to this policy: "This circular declared that in view of the frequent complaints made on the 'number of blacks and other colored persons' shipped in the Navy, henceforth colored enlistments would be no more than 5 percent of the total number of white persons enlisted weekly or monthly. No slave was to be entered under any circumstances."

There is no evidence of large-scale use of black troops in the Mexican War, probably because the initial phase of the war was essentially fought by the regulars in whose ranks there were few blacks. This limited use of black manpower stands, however, in stark contrast with the Civil War.

The reasons for enlisting the blacks in the Civil War were pragmatic, although the theory that the slave would appreciate his freedom more if he were allowed to participate in the battle to ensure that freedom appealed to idealists. In reality, the insatiable demands of the battlefield required constant refilling of the ranks. The creation of black formations "held a still larger appeal by promising to reduce the number of white men who would have to face inconvenience and danger."

Black units comprised 120 regiments of infantry, 12 of heavy artillery, and 7 of cavalry, altogether 186,017 men, an impressive total. They were employed as garrisons and received little chance to prove their mettle as soldiers, but conversely the government withstood the temptation to use them as cannon fodder. In fact, the government made a careful use of the black units for combat purposes as it became more confident in their ability. Ultimately, the blacks fought in 449 engagements, of which 39 were major battles.

Although the North was antislavery and the first to use black units in the Army (the South was ready to adopt the principle, but the war ended before any extensive use of black troops), there was no rush to give black soldiers equal rights with white soldiers. Total segregation was the rule and, in addition, blacks were not permitted to enlist in

the Regular Army. There were specific discriminatory policies with respect to pay, pensions, promotion to officer status, and the furnishing of equipment.

The most serious problem as far as the black troops were concerned was the issue of pay. Because it had been assumed that most of the black units would be used as service troops, their pay was that of laborers and not that of soldiers. For example, "White privates received \$13.00 a month plus a clothing allowance of \$3.50, while black soldiers were paid \$10.00 a month, from which \$3.00 was deducted for clothing. All blacks, regardless of rank, received the same amount."

Equality of treatment by the Federal Government was the real issue and not the pay itself. Thus, in March 1863 the black soldiers of Massachusetts refused to accept money from a state authorization intended to make up the deficit between what the Federal Government paid them and what it paid white soldiers. In February 1864, blacks undertook an effort to "mobilize pressure upon Congress to achieve passage of a bill equalizing the pay of colored soldiers" and a prominent black minister put the issue squarely:

We ask for equal pay and bounty, not because we set greater value upon money than we do upon human liberty, compared with which, money is mere trash; but we contend for equal pay and bounty upon the principle, that if we receive equal pay and bounty when we go into the war, we hope to receive equal rights and privileges when we come out of the war. If we go in equal in pay, we hope to come out equal in enfranchisement.

Finally, Congress enacted legislation on 15 June 1864 that granted equal pay retroactive to 1 January 1864 for all black soldiers, but only back to 19 April 1861 for those blacks who were free as of that date. This qualification created further controversy, and Congress finally

granted retroactive pay to all black soldiers regardless of status on any given date. The amount of money to pay the 186,017 men was no doubt considerable.

When the war ended, most of the black units were immediately disbanded. However, in the reorganization of 1869, the statutes stipulated that the enlisted men of two regiments each of cavalry and infantry should be black. These became the famous 9th and 10th Cavalry and the 24th and 25th Infantry regiments, all four of which served gallantly in the many Indian Wars of the last part of the 19th century.

The period between the Civil War and the Spanish-American War was the last, until most recently, when the Navy did not practice racial discrimination in accepting applicants. In 1870, in response to a query from an officer as to the percentage of blacks he might accept for recruitment, the official reply was that blacks "may be enlisted without other limits" than those governing general recruitment. The percentage of black enlisted personnel reflected these figures and averaged 10 percent during the period 1870 through 1890. Black enlisted men were usually assigned to be seamen, firemen, storekeepers, carpenters, water tenders, oilers, and to other specialized billets. Since men ate and slept in the company of shipmates performing similar functions, this integration of work produced integrated messing and berthing. On the other hand, prejudice was not completely absent and only a handful of blacks served as second or third-class petty officers, and none was listed as a first-class petty officer in the second quarter of 1870, 1880, or 1890. Furthermore, blacks were much more likely than whites to have served as cooks, stewards, and landsmen. Although landsmen performed a variety of unskilled tasks aboard ship, it is likely that

many blacks holding that rating acted as messmen, a category not created until 1893. In fact, one former black sailor defined "landsmen" as "the service designation for domestics."

Any discussion of the Army during the Spanish-American War would not be complete without considering the failure of our country (and in turn the armed forces) to come to grips with the problem of the black soldier. First, we must acknowledge the achievement, as previously described, of the four black regiments of the Regular Army in the Indian Wars. Little attention had been given to them by the white American, largely because they were out-of-sight and out-of-mind. However, the movement of these four regiments to staging areas in the South before the declaration of war with Spain and after the sinking of the Maine raised the whole issue of whether the black soldier was going to receive recognition commensurate with his service.

The black community was divided and, as a consequence, launched a lively debate on the response the black American should make if called upon to serve. A small but vociferous minority agreed with a black Iowan who wrote: "I will not go to war. I have no country to fight for. I have not been given my rights." The majority of black citizens, while agreeing with some of these sentiments, took the view that they should and would support the war. Their reasons were undoubtedly complex but were summarized by a black correspondent in Los Angeles:

As in all other cities the Negro is discussing his attitude toward the government in case of war. Shall he go to war and fight for the country's flag? Yes, yes, for every reason of true patriotism, it is a blessing in disguise for the Negro. He will if for no other reason be possessed of arms, which in the South in the face of threatened mob violence he is not allowed to have. He will become trained and disciplined. He will be generously remunerated for his services. He will get much honor. He will have an opportunity of proving to the world his real bravery, worth and manhood.

The first 125,000 volunteers called to the colors for the Spanish-American War contained few black men because the states responded by sending their National Guard, which excluded blacks from membership. In mass meetings and through delegations to the White House and Congress, blacks protested their exclusion from the Volunteer Army, on the basis that it was a denial of equal citizenship. The result was that the McKinley administration paid special attention to the use of black manpower, and the second call for volunteers resulted in the acceptance of black regiments from five states, one of which, Massachusetts, sent a totally integrated regiment. In addition, five "immune" regiments were recruited from the black population in the belief that blacks were somehow naturally immune to yellow fever, so prevalent in Cuba. All in all, about 10,000 black volunteers were eventually recruited.

Despite the example of the Massachusetts regiment, the black soldier did not receive what he wanted most--the opportunity to become an officer. He felt that he merited the opportunity because of his bravery on the field, where casualties to white officers had thrust the black noncommissioned officer into command and he had demonstrated both his personal bravery and his ability to lead men under fire. Perhaps typical of the black soldier's belief that he could be a leader is the following excerpt from an unsigned letter by a member of the 10th Cavalry: "The battle at Santiago de Cuba was an individual fight: it was a fight with very few officers, and the soldiers, whether non-commissioned officers or privates, who were capable of leading the boys on to victory then are surely worthy of leading them now." But

despite their ability, few officers were appointed from the ranks of the black units.

Another major disappointment to the black community came with the end of the Spanish-American War. Despite their support of the war effort, conditions for blacks throughout the nation did not improve and, instead, deteriorated.

Unfortunately, the black experience in the Spanish-American War was repeated during World War I when blacks served in totally integrated units of which a high proportion were support units and involved manual labor. The official History of the Personnel System for World War I gives the black man short shrift:

The colored draft problem was perhaps the simplest of all. The percentage of skill in the colored draft was very low, and the organizations of colored men did not require as large a number of specialists as the other organizations. The reports from the camps were very brief. Few occupations were listed. Most of the colored organizations were engineer service battalions, stevedore regiments, labor companies, etc., which required few men of skill. There were, however, cases where skilled men were needed and needed badly, and care was taken to place them. As can be readily seen, most of the orders issued were comparatively simple as compared with those for white men. Also, the colored drafts were not so large as the white, which made the work of the Central Distributing Office in this particular branch much less.

Other histories report similarities between the World War I and Spanish-American War experiences of the blacks. For instance, in 1917 the black community was divided as to the stand it would take in support of the war. There was, once more, a small vociferous minority who wanted to avoid service, but the vast majority of the community wanted to serve. The reasons were much like those advanced in support of service in Cuba: When President Wilson asked for a declaration of war against Germany, he told Congress, "The world must be made safe for

democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. . . . We are but one of the champions of the right of mankind." With very few exceptions, black spokesmen, convinced by this democratic rhetoric as well as by official promises of significant improvement in racial affairs, urged blacks to aid the country's war effort, raising the cry that "race is on trial." A faculty and student group at Howard University commented: "If we fail, our enemies will dub us COWARDS for all time: and we can never win our rightful place. But if we succeed--then eternal success."

As in the Spanish-American War, blacks were subject to different personnel treatment than whites. For example, under the National Defense Act of 1916, all regular regiments were brought up to strength by volunteers, and the four black regiments found themselves quickly at full strength. However, it was Army policy to limit the enlistment of blacks to fill vacancies in black units only, and, as a consequence, while 650,000 white volunteers were accepted, only 4000 blacks were allowed to enlist. On the other hand, large numbers of blacks were drafted. Approximately 2,291,000 blacks registered for the draft and by the time the war ended, 267,710 had been inducted into the armed forces, representing a 34.1-percent rate of acceptance as compared with a 24.04-percent rate for whites. Although black Americans were only 9 percent of those registering for the draft, they furnished 13 percent of all persons drafted for services in World War I.

The vexing problem of the lack of black officers again became an issue. In May 1917 the black community received the disturbing news that Colonel Charles Young, the only black West Point graduate on active duty and then holding the highest rank ever attained by a black officer

in the U.S. armed forces, had been retired for medical reasons. Young was sixth in line for brigadier general, and accelerated wartime promotion would have ensured that rank. His examining board had already recommended him for promotion, but when he came before the medical board for physical examination, he was pronounced unfit because of high blood pressure and ordered retired. To prove his fitness for active duty, Young rode the several hundred miles from his home in Ohio to Washington, D.C., on horseback, but to no avail.

When, in response to black demands that they be allowed to serve in combat units, the War Department created the 92nd and 93rd divisions consisting of black troops, the officers were white. Nor would the Army start a training camp to create black officers. Finally, after repeated demands by the black community, Secretary Baker agreed

to the establishment of a black officers' training camp. . . . All told, 1,200 blacks received commissions, "representing about seven-tenths of 1 percent of the officer strength of the army although 13 percent of the enlisted troops were blacks. . . ." In addition an effective ceiling was placed on the advance of black officers beyond the company grades "regardless of ability."

One good thing that can be said of the officer training camp was that two-thirds of those who were accepted were enlisted men from the ranks of the four Regular Army black regiments. This was, at least, a better showing than in the Spanish-American War and the period between the two wars. Nevertheless, there was much to be done before equality of opportunity was achieved.

After World War I, the returning black soldier underwent the same disillusionment as after the Spanish-American War. He was not accepted by the white society, and there were ominous grumblings, particularly in

the South, that the black soldier was expecting too much and must be kept in his place. To eradicate any notions of equality returning black soldiers might have picked up on the Continent, they were insulted, stripped of their uniforms, and beaten by white ruffians and even police. During the bloody months from June to December 1919--a period known as the Red Summer of 1919--twenty-six incidents of serious racial violence erupted in American towns and cities, where police authorities gave little or no protection to black citizens. In many of these riots, black veterans armed themselves and fought back against white mobs.

When the war ended, the hard-won right of the black soldier to aspire to be an officer was lost. There was no increase in the number of black regular units. Black soldiers were confined to infantry and cavalry units, and they were barred from the specialized branches of the military service. The Air Corps totally rejected blacks. There were no new black line officers; the total number remained at two.

History repeated itself again during World War II. The War Department found out very early in the war that when it assigned black troops to Southern areas, particularly black men raised in the North, racial tensions immediately heightened. Therefore, the War Department tried, to the extent possible, to assign black soldiers to bases in the North. However, the majority of air bases had been located in the South because of the better weather and, consequently, the more flying time available. Therefore, there were fewer bases to assign black airmen in the North. For example, in December 1942 the Army Air Corps had 71,695 black enlisted personnel and a year later twice that number. Given the restrictions posed by base locations and the social structure of the South that were mutually contradictory, racial tensions would continue to grow.

The Army Air Corps was also under great political pressure from the black community to use black airmen. During the 1930s, the Air Corps resolutely refused to use blacks. As a result, there was a widespread campaign by the black press and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to pressure the War Department to require the Air Corps to allow qualified blacks to enlist. In 1931 the official answer was that it required "men of technical and mechanical experience and ability. As a rule, the colored man has not been attracted to this field in the same way or the same extent as the white man."

Congressional pressure forced the Air Corps to establish civilian pilot training schools for blacks. However, despite the fact that the first class of 1939 graduated 91 of 100 blacks who took the training, the Air Corps did not accept any of the graduates into its ranks, presumably because the black graduates would have to serve as pilots in all-white units. The official position of the War Department was that

It is the policy of the War Department not to intermingle colored and white enlisted personnel in the same regimental organization. The condition which has made this policy necessary is not the responsibility of the Department, but to ignore it would produce situations destructive of morale, and, therefore, definitely detrimental to the preparations for national defense in this emergency. This existing policy has been proven satisfactory over a long period of years. It provides for a full percentage of colored personnel and a wide variety of military units. Our colored regiments have a splendid morale, and their high percentage of re-enlistments is evidence of the wisdom of the present system.

Segregation was responsible, in part, for the problems the Air Corps was having in getting enough qualified personnel to handle its technical requirements. Recall that by December 1943 the Air Corps had

about 140,000 black enlisted personnel. About 15 percent of these men scored in the first three mental categories, which meant that they could qualify for, and graduate from, technical schools. Yet because of the segregation policies and the failure of the Air Corps to add black combat units into the force basis, these men were assigned almost entirely to labor-type units. These assignments were made regardless of mental scores. Thus, some 24,000 potential technicians were wasted as they were relegated to segregated units where there were not enough specialties to use their skills.

However, not all potentially useful black airmen were wasted. Under pressure from President Franklin Roosevelt, the Air Corps accepted the first blacks for flight training. A segregated air base was activated in Tuskegee, Alabama. In addition to the 47 black pilots in the squadron, 429 enlisted personnel were assigned to various maintenance and support functions. The unit was designated as the 99th Squadron to be followed the next year by a newly activated 100th Squadron. The pilots had been trained in the civilian training program mentioned earlier. These squadrons later proved their valor in combat, although not without having to overcome other obstacles.

Before the war ended, the War Department realized that personnel management was suffering because of the segregation policy. As a consequence, it initiated a review of the policies toward black soldiers. Numerous studies were completed, evaluated, and digested. In addition, a board of four General Officers under Lieutenant General Alvin C. Gillem was convened to consider the matter. After listening to much conflicting testimony and many witnesses, the Gillem Board stated that it was the "considered opinion of this Board that a progressive

policy for greater utilization of the Negro manpower be formulated and implemented now. . . . The Nation should not fail to use the assets developed through a closer relationship of the races during the years of the war. [The program] must eliminate, at the earliest practicable moment, any consideration based on race." The Gillem Board was proposing desegregation, but the time was not appropriate. "In fact, the recommendations were premature. American society remained segregated and the majority still had to be convinced that integration was the best way."

The postwar period in the Air Corps saw the continued segregation of blacks and the consequent problem of underutilization discussed previously. An Air Force historian found that the problem was, in a sense, even more severe because

following the massive demobilization [the Air Corps] found a need for blacks because white men were not enlisting in sufficient numbers to perform the defense mission. . . . The service did not agree that the solution to the problem was integration. The Tactical Air Command (TAC) complained that it had "too many colored personnel," yet the Army Air Corps accepted all the blacks it could because of its manpower needs. . . . All units needed skilled men, but trained blacks could not be employed to the extent of their abilities nor wherever needed. Segregation, therefore, proved burdensome for all.

Desegregation was finally set into motion by Executive Order 9981 signed on 26 July 1948. The events leading to the signing of the order are largely political in nature and revolved around the efforts of President Truman and his challenger, Thomas B. Dewey, to capture the black vote. However, whatever the cause of Executive Order 9981, the fact was that desegregation as an issue had finally reached its place in history. Inexorable social forces had been at work for almost a century

and though society as a whole had to wait for integration, the statement of Executive Order 9981 began the end of segregation in the armed forces:

It is essential that there be maintained in the Armed Services of the United States the highest standards of democracy, with equality of treatment and opportunity for all those who serve. . . . It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the Armed Services without regard to race.

The Korean War underscored the effectiveness of integration within the Air Force. Aside from allowing the full use of all skills regardless of race, the record of black airmen and pilots also served to highlight to the black population, through reports in the black press, that they were fighting side by side with whites for the first time since the Revolutionary War. Thus, from the days of the Revolution (when there was no segregation) to the Korean War, the nation had come full circle in its policies of utilizing all its manpower assets.

As the preceding discussion shows, the reasons for the mismanagement of black manpower are complex, but in the final analysis reflected the society as a whole because segregation, until recently, was an essential element of American life. This is not a total answer, however, because large numbers of blacks served in all of our wars (except the Mexican War) and until the Civil War served on a nonsegregated basis.

Part of the answer lies in the perception of the black in stereotypes: He seems to have been considered as best suited to serve as a cook or a mess boy during the Colonial period, even though so unlikely a source as a Hessian diarist noted the presence of large numbers of blacks in the infantry of the Revolutionary Army. Part of

the answer lies in the black population's difficulty in obtaining an education. Large numbers of blacks ended up in the World War drafts in mental categories IV and V because that index was a measure of trainability, and the less education a man had the more likely he was to score in the IV or V category. Part of the answer lies in fear--the fear, particularly in the South during the early days of the nation, that to place arms in the hands of a black was to invite violence or revolution even though history shows that the black's reaction was quite the reverse. The black wanted to prove his loyalty and to be accepted into the mainstream of American society. Finally, part of the answer lies in the totality of the problems listed above; because of pragmatic considerations, all-black units were deemed too time-consuming to train. Yet with the social revolution of the 20th century, the black has been able to take his place in integrated units and has proved in Korea and Vietnam that he is equal in fighting skills.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Adjutant General's Office, Central Decimal Files, 1917-1925, 220-121
((6-8-200 to 220.271 (10-16-17))), Box No. 417, located in the National
Archives, Washington, D.C.

Annals of Congress, 16th Congress, 2nd Session.

Army General Orders. A complete set is in the U.S. Army Library in the
Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

Army, Navy, Air Force Journal, 1950-1955.

Army and Navy Register, 1880-1898.

Army Regulations, particularly AR635-208, AR635-209, AR615-5.

Army Times, 1980.

Conversations with Selected Staff Sections of the Armed Forces.

General Regulations for the Army of the United States, Washington, 1847.

The Military and Naval Magazine, 1833-1835.

Personal experience of the author during the period 1951-1965 as a staff
officer and commander, United States Army.

Reports of the Secretary of Defense, 1948-1965.

Reports of the Secretary of Navy, 1870-1939.

Reports of the Secretary of War, 1827-1939.

The Retired Officer's Magazine, 1970-1980.

United States Statutes at Large have been used extensively for exact
wording of various legislative acts discussed in the text.

GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES AND PUBLICATIONS

Air Force History Study, The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964, by
Lieutenant Colonel Alan L. Gropman, Washington, D.C., 1978.

Air Historical Study, No. 76, Classification and Assignment of Enlisted
Men in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1945, Historical Division, Air
University, U.S. Air Force, 1953.

Army Air Forces Historical Studies, No. 39, Legislation Relating to the Air Corps Personnel and Training Programs, 1907-1939, AAF Historical Office Headquarters, Army Air Forces, December 1945.

N. Kent Boyd and Harry H. Jones, An Analysis of Factors Related to Desertion among FY1968 and FY1969 Army Accessions, Manpower Development Division, Air Force Human Resources Laboratory, sponsored by the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Report MR 73-1, January 1973.

Bryon Fairchild and Jonathan Grossman, United States Army in World War II, The War Department, The Army and Industrial Manpower, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1959.

Kent R. Greenfield et al., The Army Ground Forces: The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, Historical Division, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1947.

"History of Personnel Division, G-1, War Department General Staff, World War II," unpublished manuscript in the Office of the Chief of Military History, Call Number 2-2-1.

History of the Personnel System, Vol. 1: The Personnel System of the United States Army, Adjutant General's Department, Washington, 1919.

House Armed Services Hearing on the Disability Retirement of General Earl C. Anderson, USMC, 3 July 1975.

James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775-1953, Army Historical Series, Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1966.

Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 30-21D, Washington, D.C., June 1955, fn. p. 14.

Ulysses Lee, The U.S. Army in World War II: The Employment of Negro Troops, Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1959.

Leonard L. Lerwill, The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-211, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1954.

Military Compensation Background Papers: Compensation Elements and Related Manpower Cost Items, Their Purpose and Legislative Background, Third Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, August 1976.

Lieutenant Dennis Denmark Nelson, The Integration of the Negro into the United States Navy, 1776-1947, a monograph from the thesis of the same title submitted to the Department of Sociology, Howard University, in

partial fulfillment of the requirements for Degree of Master of Arts, second printing, Department of the Navy, NAVEXOS-P-526, 1948.

Roberta R. Palmer et al., The Army Ground Forces, The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops, Historical Division Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1948.

"Recomputation and Other Retirement Legislation," Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Retired Pay Revisions of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-Second Congress, 2nd Session, October 4, 5, 11, and 12, 1972.

"Statement of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics," Hearings before the Military Personnel Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, 19 February 1980.

"Statistical Abstract of the United States since Colonial Times," Series Y904-916, Y917-926, Y856-903.

Strategic Air Command Missile Chronology, 1939-1973, Office of the Historian, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, 2 September 1975.

Mattie R. Treadwell, The U.S. Army in World War II: The Women's Army Corps, Historical Division, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1954.

United States Army Field Manual, FM 101-10-1, 1971.

United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919, Historical Division, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1948.

U.S. Military Retirement Pay History and Analysis of Key Legislation, 1861-1958, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Office, 2 December 1972.

BOOKS

Thomas B. Barquis, Keep the Last Bullet for Yourself, Two Continents Publishing, New York, 1976.

The Bible, King James version.

Charles K. Bolton, The Private Soldier under Washington, Charles Scribner, New York, 1912.

Stewart Brooks, Civil War Medicine, Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois, 1966.

Bugle Notes, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1937.

John F. Callan, The Military Laws of the United States, Relating to the Army, Volunteers, Militia, and to Bounty Lands and Pensions, from the Foundations of the Government to the Year 1863, 2nd ed., G. Childs, Philadelphia, 1863.

John F. Callan and A. W. Russell, Laws of the United States Relating to the Navy and Marine Corps from the Formation of the Government to 1859; To Which Are Prefixed the Constitution of the United States (with an index thereto) and a Synopsis of the Legislation of Congress, Respecting Naval Affairs, during the Revolutionary War, John Murphy & Company, Baltimore, 1859, p. 204.

Frank Tracy Carlton, The History and Problems of Organized Labor, D.C. Heath & Company, New York, 1920.

Samuel Carter, III, The Incredible Great White Fleet, Crowell-Collier Press, New York, 1971.

George R. Clark et al., A Short History of the United States Navy, Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1939.

Graham A. Cosmas, An Army for Empires: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War, University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 1971.

Rudolph Cronau, The Army of the American and Its Organizer, New York, 1923.

Richard Henry Dana, Two Years before the Mast, Airmont Publishing Co., New York, 1965.

Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era, Years of Peace--1907-1910, Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1974.

John Dickinson, The Building of an Army: A Detailed Account of Legislation, Administration and Opinion in the United States, 1915-1920, The Century Company, New York, 1922.

Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., The Civilian and the Military, Oxford University Press, New York, 1956.

Encyclopedia Americana, New York, 1951.

Jack D. Foner, Blacks and the Military in American History, A New Perspective, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1974.

-----, The United States Soldier between Two Wars: Army Life and Reforms, 1865-1898, Humanities Press, New York, 1970.

Charles E. Francis, The Tuskegee Airmen: The Story of the Negro in the U.S. Air Force, Bruce Humphries, Inc., Boston, 1955.

Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington, Vol. 3, Charles Scribner, New York, 1951.

- William A. Ganoe, The History of the United States Army, Ashton, Maryland, 1964.
- Willard B. Gatewood, Jr., "Smoked Yankees" and the Struggle for Empire: Letters from Negro Soldiers, 1898-1902, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1971.
- Alfred Goldberg et al., A History of the United States Air Force, 1907-1957, D. Van Nostrand, Inc., Princeton, New Jersey, 1957.
- William F. Halsey, Admiral Halsey's Story, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1947.
- Frederick S. Harrod, Manning the New Navy: The Development of the Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899-1940, Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1978, p. 9.
- Robert A. Hart, The Great White Fleet: Its Voyage around the World, 1907-1909, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1965.
- Louis C. Hatch, The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army, Harvard Historical Series, Vol. X, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1904.
- James H. Hayes, The Evolution of Military Officer Personnel Management Policies: A Preliminary Study with Parallels from Industry, The Rand Corporation, R-2276-AF, August 1978.
- Captain A. R. Hetzel, Military Laws of the United States; Including Those Relating to the Army, Marine Corps, Volunteers, Militia, and to Bounty Lands and Pensions: To which Is Prefixed the Rules and Articles of War, and the Constitution of the United States, 3rd ed., Washington, 1846.
- Samuel F. Holbrook, Threescore Years: An Autobiography, James French and Company, Boston, 1857.
- Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root, Dodd, Mead & Company, New York, 1938.
- Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism, The Free Press, New York, 1972.
- Harold D. Langley, Social Reforms in the United States Navy, 1798-1862, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1967.
- Cyril Curtis Ling, The Management of Personnel Relations, History and Origins, Richard D. Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, 1965.
- Walter Lord, The Dawn's Early Light, Norton Company, New York, 1972.

George Melling (comp.), Laws Relating to the Navy, Annotated, Including the Constitution of the United States, the Revised Statutes of the United States, and the United States Statutes at Large, Washington, D.C., 1922, Sec. 1417.

Charles R. Milton, The Development of Philosophies of Personnel Administration, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1960.

-----, "The Development of Philosophies of Personnel Administration," Ph.D. thesis, The University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1960.

Samuel Eliot Morison, John Paul Jones: A Sailor's Biography, Little, Brown and Company, Toronto, 1959.

David S. Muzzey, History of the American People, Ginn and Company, New York, 1934.

The Negro Handbook, compiled by the Editors of Ebony, Johnson Publishing Company, Toronto, 1959.

Charles O. Paullin, History of Naval Administration, 1775-1911, U.S. Naval Institute, Maryland, 1968.

E. B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz, Sea Power, A Naval History, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1960.

Don Rickey, Jr., Forty Miles a Day on Beans and Hay: The Enlisted Soldier Fighting the Indian Wars, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1963.

William H. Riker, Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 1957.

Matthew F. Steele, American Campaigns, Vol. I, United States Infantry Association, Washington, D.C., 1935.

Mark Sullivan, Our Times: The United States, 1900-1925, the Twenties, Vol. VI, Charles Scribner and Sons, New York, 1935.

F. G. Swanborough, United States Military Aircraft since 1909, Putnam, New York, 1963.

Alexis de Toqueville, Democracy in America, The Henry Reeves text revised by Francis Bowen and further corrected and edited by Phillips Bradley, Vol. I, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1960 (eighth printing).

Archibald D. Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1949.

Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution, Vol. I, Macmillan Co., New York, 1952.

Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, Macmillan Company, New York, 1967.

E. C. Wines, Two Years and a Half in the American Navy, Vol. 1, London, 1833.

Chester W. Wright, Economic History of the United States, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1949, p. 98.

Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., Admiral, USN (ret.), On Watch, Quadrangle, The New York Times Book Co., New York, 1976.

ARTICLES

"American Seamen for the Navy," The Military and Naval Magazine, Vol. III, No. 1, March 1834.

Secretary Newton D. Baker, "The Political Factor in War," speech before the Army War College, 22 April 1927, National War College Library, 325-37-54.

Park Benjamin, "Naval Promotion from the Ranks," Independent, Vol. 53, No. 2734, 25 April 1901.

E. G. Campbell, "The United States Military Railroads, 1862-1865: War Time Operation and Maintenance," The Journal of American Military History Foundation, Vol. II, No. 2, Summer 1938.

Lieutenant Commander F. E. Chadwick, "The Training of Seamen," Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, Vol. 6, No. 11, 1880.

"Golden State Guardsmen," 69th P.A. Detachment, Sacramento, California, Vol. 5, No. 11, November 1978.

Rear Admiral Caspar F. Goodrich, "Desertions in the Navy: A Contribution to the Discussion of the Question," Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, Vol. 31, No. 116, 1905.

John W. Hare, "Military Punishment in the War of 1812," Military Affairs: Journal of the American Military Institute, Vol. 4, 1940.

Frederick S. Harrod, "Integration of the Navy (1941-1978)," Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, October 1979, p. 42.

Lieutenant Commander John Hood, "Desertion from the Navy," Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, Vol. 31, No. 114, 1905.

Lieutenant Hugh Johnson, "The Lamb Rampant," Everybody's Magazine, Vol. 18, No. 3, March 1908.

"A Pampero in the Rio de la Plata," The Military and Naval Magazine, Vol. VI, No. 1, September 1835.

David E. Philips, "Negroes in the American Revolution," Journal of American History, Vol. 5, 1911.

"Recollections of a Sailor," The Military and Naval Magazine, Vol. V, No. 5, July 1835.

"School for Rank and File of the Army," The Military and Naval Magazine, Vol. III, No. 1, March 1834.

Commander Roy C. Smith, USN, "Personnel and Promotion Reduced to Its Simplest Terms," U.S. Navy Institute, 1906.

-----, "The Recruiting of Navy Personnel," Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, Vol. 28, No. 1, March 1902.

"Soldier," The Military and Naval Magazine, Vol. II, No. 2, October 1833.

Lieutenant Ivor Spencer, "Overseas War in 1846," Military Affairs: Journal of the American Military Institute, Vol. IX, No. 4, Winter 1945.

George J. Stansfield, "History of the Judge Advocate General's Department, United States Army," Military Affairs: Journal of the American Military Institute, Vol. 9, No. 3, Fall 1945.

Albert C. Stillson, "Military Policy Without Political Guidance: Theodore Roosevelt's Navy," Military Affairs: Journal of the American Military Institute, Vol. 25, No. 1, Spring 1961.

Jerome Thomases, "Fort Bridger: A Western Community," Military Affairs: Journal of the American Military Institute, Vol. V, No. 3, Fall 1941.

Edward S. Wallace, "The United States Army in Mexico City," Military Affairs: Journal of the American Military Institute, Vol. 13, No. 3, Fall 1949.

Edgar B. Wesley, "Life at a Frontier Post: Fort Atkinson, 1823-1826," Journal of the American Military Institute, Vol. 3, No. 4, Winter 1939.

Captain A. S. Williams, USMC, "Desertion and Its Prevention," Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 1904.

FILMED
9-8